Chapter 2

Policy-making Capacity of Political Parties in Wales

Anwen Elias
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Introduction
Political parties are central to any democratic political system. They are a key linkage between citizens and government. By contesting elections, political parties aim to mobilise popular support for a particular vision of how society should be organised. Translating this vision into concrete policies presents parties with major challenges. It tests their ability to respond to and reflect the needs and aspirations of their supporters, and to come up with appropriate solutions that can improve society.

This paper considers the extent to which political parties in post-devolution Wales have been able to meet these challenges. The empirical evidence presented here draws on interviews undertaken during July and August 2012 with representatives of the main Welsh political parties - Welsh Labour, Welsh Conservatives, Welsh Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru. A full list of interviews is provided in Appendix 1. The paper is divided into two parts. The first outlines the current capacity and procedures for making policy within the Welsh parties. The aim is to identify changes in policy-making capacity in the run-up to, and since, the creation of the National Assembly. Drawing on this empirical evidence, the second section identifies areas of policy under-capacity and makes recommendations for addressing these weaknesses. Particular attention is paid to resources for policy development within government, and the public funding for policy development within political parties more generally.

Dynamics of policy-making in Wales’ political parties
This section outlines the process by which policy is generally made in each of Wales’s political parties, and the ways in which this has evolved in the post-devolution period. The main focus here is on capacity to make policy related to the National Assembly, since this is the clear priority of the parties themselves. A much briefer consideration is given to policy-making with regard to other territorial levels, whilst the implications of being in government for policy-making are considered in the next section.

Welsh Labour
The principle motor for policy generation in Welsh Labour is the Welsh Policy Forum, introduced in 1998. Mirroring the National Policy Forum in place within the UK party, the model replaced a system of formulating policy based on debating and passing resolutions at conference, with a rolling cycle of policy development leading up to the next Assembly election. The work of directing and co-ordinating the Welsh Policy Forum’s activities is done by a Joint Policy Committee, with
one policy officer employed in Labour central office (and financed by the UK party) assisting with collating information and drafting documents. Party members are given the opportunity to discuss and comment on policy documents drafted by the Welsh Policy Forum. After the formal approval of a Special Conference, these then form the basis of an Assembly election manifesto. Whilst constitutionally the party’s Welsh policies must also receive the formal approval of the UK party’s National Executive Committee, in practice this very rarely undermines the control of the Welsh party organisation over Welsh policy.

There are limitations to the scope of Welsh Labour’s policy-making. Most importantly, the Welsh Policy Forum (and the party’s annual conference) is proscribed from discussing policies that fall outside the Assembly’s area of competencies. Moreover, the party has very limited formal input into policies for General and European election manifestos in Wales. These are largely produced at the initiative of Welsh MPs and MEPs, with the party élite in Wales only consulted in order to avoid policy inconsistencies and inaccuracies.

In spite of its deliberative aspirations, the policy forum process in Wales has been subject to considerable criticism. Interviewees identified two main problems. Firstly, the process has been dominated by the party élite, in particular government ministers and their Special Advisers. According to one interviewee, “The way the manifesto is arrived at in Wales doesn't necessarily reflect, or have much to do with, the way that the Welsh Policy Forum operates... it is Special Advisers and Ministers... that write the manifesto in the end”.

This trend was particularly apparent in the cycle running up to the 2007 Assembly election. In response to internal discontent with Executive control of the process, the approach to the 2011 manifesto was different. Greater emphasis was placed on consultation not only within the party, but also with external interests in order to generate “a manifesto made by the people of Wales for the people of Wales”.

Secondly, the capacity of other parts of the party to contribute to the deliberative process, thus serving as a counterweight to the policy resources available to the party in government, remains limited. On the one hand, it can be difficult for ordinary members (via branches and constituency parties) to contribute meaningfully to policy deliberation. Providing informed responses by specified timetables is difficult for all but the most active and engaged grass-roots associations. On the other hand, interviewees raised questions about the capacity of the party at large - members, affiliated organisations and the professional organisation - to generate new ideas. One commented that it is insufficient to expect a voluntary organisation to be the exclusive source of new policy ideas. Others noted that trade unions affiliated to Welsh Labour have very limited policy capacity whilst the party itself only employs one professional policy officer.

One attempt to overcome this lack of capacity was the creation of Ideas Wales, an arms-length think-tank with minimal central-party funding aimed at generating new policy ideas that could feed into the policy forum process. However, the level of activity (and hence output in terms of policy suggestions) has fluctuated depending on the varying levels of commitment of key individuals associated with it. The result is that much of the policy initiative within Welsh Labour inevitably rests with better-resourced government ministers and their Special Advisers. One former Adviser recalled their driving role in providing policy direction for the party’s manifestos in the following terms: “Our job is to make sure that we’re reading what's going on there, think-tank land, scouring
around for new policy developments that can be seen coming... Our job is to add to the gene pool of ideas that are available for manifesto construction.”

**Welsh Conservatives**

Until 1997, Welsh policy-making within the Conservative Party had largely been the responsibility of the UK party. In the context of this historical absence of a policy capacity within the Welsh party organisation, new processes were gradually created from 1999 onwards.

What emerged was a model of policy-making driven almost exclusively by the party’s Director of Policy, a post held by David Melding AM until 2011. This involves formulating policy documents in the key areas of Assembly competence, and putting these out to extensive consultation among party members as well as external civil society groups. Two policy conferences a year provide further opportunities to discuss these ideas, although few final policy decisions are taken here. Final manifesto approval is provided by a Welsh Management Board composed of representatives of the party’s voluntary, elected and professional wings. Just as with Welsh Labour, the Welsh Conservatives’ Annual Conference has no formal role in approving party policy. Thus there are limited direct opportunities for party members to sign off the party’s policy programme, creating a policy process that is strongly directed by the party élite.

It should be noted that there is no policy-development capacity within Welsh Conservative Central Office (made up of a core staff that is funded by a block grant from the UK party). Whilst it is in theory possible to take advantage of the research facilities within Conservative Central Office, in practice this is only done for issues that cut across devolved policy boundaries. Policy development is thus driven by key individuals, drawing in an ad hoc manner on limited resources available to the Welsh party organisation and from Assembly allowances to individual AMs and party groups.

Indeed, the party has enjoyed considerable policy autonomy in Wales, with successive leaders of the UK party contenting themselves with letting the Welsh party ‘get on with it’. Interviewees reported that co-ordination has only been required on the big constitutional questions. Since being in government in Westminster, there has been increased dialogue, and closer day-to-day co-ordination of policy positions, especially with the Welsh Office. However, there are limited opportunities for the Welsh party to formally feed into policy-making within the party more generally, in relation, for example, to General Election and European manifestos. As with Welsh Labour, the Welsh organisation is routinely consulted on, but not very involved with, policy-making beyond that which is relevant for the National Assembly.

**Welsh Liberal Democrats**

The Welsh Liberal Democrats are defined as a state party within a larger federal (UK) organisation. As such, they have always had a tradition of policy-making in Wales, in all areas apart from fiscal policy, defence and law and order (Deacon, 2007: 156). Because of this history of autonomous policy-making in Wales, Welsh Liberal Democrat interviewees were unanimous in declaring their party to be among the best prepared for devolution. As one put it, “it was in our DNA”.

Little organisational adaptation has thus been required. Policy-formulation has always been, and remains, the responsibility of the Welsh Policy Committee composed of seven elected members, a number of representatives from other committees (for example, the Welsh Campaigns Committee), some co-opted members, the party’s President, MPs and AMs. The Policy Committee and its sub-committees have responsibility for determining areas of policy development, and preparing policy
papers for discussion at the party’s conference. Only when approved by conference does a policy proposal become official party policy, and available for manifesto inclusion.

Interviewees stressed the independence of this policy process in post-devolution Wales, with the party’s policy autonomy having never been threatened by interference from the federal party. The same model works for producing Welsh General Election and European manifestos (although a lack of resources means there is much closer co-ordination with federal policy-making bodies).

This model of policy-making places great emphasis on the active engagement of party members (Evans, 2007). However, post-devolution it has come under strain in different ways. Firstly, the efficacy of the process itself has been questioned. One interviewee described the party’s model of policy-making as “absolutely tortuous”. The need to respond to day-to-day political developments within the National Assembly requires policy flexibility that is constrained within the extant model of inclusive decision-making. Similar tensions were experienced during the Liberal Democrats’ period in coalition government (2000-2003), when party members felt excluded from executive decision-making because “the structures in which policy and decisions are supposed to be taken had been bypassed”.

Secondly, the party has struggled to generate high-quality and appealing policies, not least because of a lack of funding available for policy development. The Welsh Policy Committee relies overwhelmingly on unrewarded voluntary contributions, and there is only one member of central office staff who has a policy development remit (financed by the Electoral Commission’s Policy Development Grant scheme). One interviewee who held this role recalled the difficulty of carrying out the role effectively:

“You have to cover a yawning chasm. I had to do health one day and European funding the next. And you just can’t be an expert on all of those things in any way”.

In order to address this weakness, there have been efforts from the outset of devolution to involve external actors in the process of generating policy ideas. Most recently, this has taken the form of inviting lobbyists and civil society actors to tea and biscuits with Liberal Democrat researchers and policy officers in the Assembly. In this way, Assembly resources aimed at supporting the day-to-day work of AMs are being used to fill a gap in policy development capacity in the party outwith the Assembly.

**Plaid Cymru**

As with the Welsh Liberal Democrats, for Plaid Cymru the Annual Conference has always been, and remains, the body that determines broad policy principles. However, within these parameters there has been scope for experimentation with different modes of policy-making. One outcome is that the Annual Conference has evolved into more of a forum for approving broad policy principles, rather than discussing and deciding on policy details. This latter responsibility has shifted over time, with paid policy staff in central office, elected party officers, and elected AMs (and, from 2007-2011, Government Ministers) contributing to, and sometimes competing for control of, policy formulation. Whilst policy-making for General and European elections is subject to broadly the same procedures, the party’s MPs and MEPs play a more dominant role in drafting documents and manifestos.

Post-devolution Plaid Cymru’s aim has always been to generate policies befitting a credible party of potential government within the National Assembly. Initial adaptation to meet this goal was characterised by three distinct developments. Firstly, new capacity to develop policy within the party’s professional organisation was created. This trend began in advance of the first Assembly elections, but was confirmed and increased as a result of Plaid Cymru’s qualification for a Policy
Development Grant from the Electoral Commission. This funding stream has provided an annual sum of between £134,000-£150,000 for the specific purposes of developing policies for inclusion in manifestos for local, Assembly, Westminster and European elections (Electoral Commission, 2012).

Whilst some party interviewees speculated about whether the party had put these funds to best use, there was a general recognition of the impact this money had on the party’s policy-making capacity. In the words of one:

“I’m absolutely of the opinion that this [grant] enriched the process of formulating policy”.

Alongside this new policy unit, a second development saw the creation of a Policy Forum, composed of a mix of elected and unelected party members, with the remit of drafting and commissioning policy in a more inclusive manner. Under the direction of the Director of Policy, the aim was to:

“...create a forum for on-going policy discussion... so that [policy propositions] weren’t as much of a shock at the annual conference”.

Thirdly, a research capacity was created within the National Assembly, as AMs decided to pool some of their individual administrative allowances to employ researchers on a group basis. Plaid Cymru was unique among the Welsh political parties in doing this.

However, these developments had the result of creating a policy-making process which was “disjointed” and un-coordinated. Increased policy-making capacity did not necessarily result in better policies. Addressing these weaknesses took time. On the one hand, the Policy Forum gradually declined in its level of activity. On the other hand, electoral decline in the 2003 Assembly election and the 2005 General Election led to a decline in the amount of public funds available for research purposes. In turn this prompted a change in personnel at the central policy unit, and the adoption of a clearer leadership structure for the party.\(^5\)

These experiences also informed a new approach to the development of the 2007 Assembly manifesto, based on extensive public consultation and one-day policy conferences as the basis for policy development. According to interviewees, this process led to more comprehensive and relevant policies. A recent internal review of the party’s policy-making procedures recommended building on this model by better utilising members’ and external expertise, creating standing policy working groups, and making better use of research facilities available to AMs, MPs and MEPs (Plaid Cymru, 2012: 24-6).

**Improving the policy-making capacity of Welsh political parties: considerations and recommendations**

All political parties in Wales have sought to improve their capacity to generate high-quality public policy, as a basis for good governance within the National Assembly for Wales. There is a common trend of moving away from the Annual Conference as the primary policy-making forum, towards alternative processes that are deemed to be produce higher quality and more appealing policies, in a more effective way. The use of policy forums, policy conferences and seminars have become widespread (albeit more ad hoc in some parties than others), as has the involvement of civil society actors in the generation of new policy ideas. All four parties are increasingly seeking to develop ‘made in Wales’ policies that are the product of extensive internal and external consultation. These developments have the potential to enhance the quality of parties’ policies for Wales.
There is also evidence, however, of areas where political parties’ policy-making efforts are frustrated. In some instances problems are of a procedural nature and relate to historical ‘ways-of-doing’ policy. This is the case with the formal models of policy-making within Welsh Labour and the Welsh Liberal Democrats. Such issues are not considered further here, as they relate to individual parties’ decisions about how they organise themselves internally.

Interviewees also pointed to the weakness of Welsh civil society as a contributing factor to under-developed policy-making capacity. Parties of all ideological persuasions acknowledged the importance of such actors in contributing to policy generation, and noted important improvements in their capacity to contribute to this process since 1999. However, there was a consensus that more could be done. In the words of one interviewee:

“All perceived weakness in the political parties is reflected in a wider weakness in the Welsh policy community”.

However, other problems of policy-making capacity relate to the availability of resources to support policy formulation. Again, in part this is an internal party matter, as political parties make their own decisions about how to spend funds derived from sources, such as (declining) membership and affiliation fees, and fundraising. There are two additional considerations however: (i) resources for policy development whilst in government; and (ii) public funding for policy development within political parties. These are now considered in turn.

(i) Resources for policy development whilst in government

It was noted above that policy formulation processes within the Welsh political parties turn primarily around the generation of content for Assembly election manifestos. This focus changes when a party is in government. Three of the four Welsh parties have experience of being in government within the Assembly. And whilst manifestos form the basis of a party’s activities in government, interviewees also acknowledged that assuming executive functions gives rise to distinct policy-making requirements. Policy must be more detailed, and much often respond to changing political (for example, emergence of a coalition), legislative, regulatory and financial constraints.

Under these circumstances, the party in government, in particular Ministers and their Special Advisers, has strong control over policy-making, at the expense of the party at large and the party group in the Assembly itself. One Labour AM acknowledged the implications of this shift in power in the following unambiguous terms:

“One thing I’ve never quite understood... is what is the point of being a backbench Labour MP?”

Another actor in policy-making at the executive level is the civil service. However, among interviewees with government experience there was a general concern with the low quality of policy advice provided to Ministers. One stated that:

“... the Welsh civil service is obsessed with policy-making, but on a low grade level. You don’t get the big strategic thinking.”

Another recalled how their Special Adviser had to:

“... re-write things because the material coming out of the civil service was so awful, not
This weakness undoubtedly undermines the capacity of the Welsh Government to make policy, although as the subject of another research paper, it is also not considered further here.\textsuperscript{7}

What these comments also point to, however, is the role played by Special Advisers in policy-formation within the governing sphere. This is enhanced in a context where Ministers require policy advice that is not forthcoming, or is inadequate, from the civil service. The example of Welsh Labour also points to the driving role Special Advisers can play in driving policy-formation within the party beyond government, given the resources and expertise that this position can bring to policy formulation.

This observation is an internal matter for political parties themselves to deal with, as it relates to the balance of power between different party actors in the policy process. A different issue, however, is the way in which Special Advisers are appointed. General procedures on the employment of Special Advisers are set out in Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, as well as the Welsh Government’s Ministerial Code (Welsh Government, 2011: 7). However, one issue raised by interviewees was the way these posts were advertised. It was noted that whilst under Rhodri Morgan, external advertisement was the norm, this has recently changed with posts being advertised internally. The perceived result has been the appointment of individuals notable more for their loyalty to the Labour Party than their substantive policy or policy-making expertise. This development was criticised by one interviewee as being “extremely worrying” in terms of the implications for the quality of government policy. Another argued that Special Advisers needed to have policy expertise:

“... otherwise Ministers are so vulnerable to civil service capture. If the only advice they ever hear is that from civil servants, they soon come to rely on that in a way that you are struggling to get an element of challenge in the system”.

This raises the question of whether there is a need for change in the procedure for appointing Special Advisers, requiring greater transparency in their appointment through external advertisement and a clearer requirement for policy expertise alongside party political affiliation.

(ii) Public funding for policy development within political parties

Here, two aspects are considered: the support available to AMs to undertake their Assembly responsibilities; and public funding available via the Electoral Commission in the form of Policy Development Grants.

Assembly financial support for policy development

From the outset, the National Assembly has made funds available to AMs to support their work. Policy development has been a key aspect of this work (National Assembly Independent Review Panel, 2009: 40). The employment of research staff has been a way of enabling AMs to deliver on this aspect of their remit. Additional funds have also been available to party groups to undertake their work effectively, including policy research.

Comparable to ‘Short’ money in the House of Commons\textsuperscript{8}, one important difference is that funds are available to all party groups with at least three AMs, as opposed to opposition parties only in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{9} In its report on allowances to support AMs’ work, an Independent Review Panel was concerned that these funds were not being used in such a way as to “maximise the strategic capacity of the Assembly to cope with its workload” (National Assembly Independent Review Panel, 2009: 111). One recommendation was to centralise resources within party groups, in order to enhance
the policy development and scrutiny capacity of political parties within the Assembly.

However, interviewees expressed general satisfaction with the level of support provided to AMs to undertake their Assembly work. Although some members questioned whether current funding levels would be adequate given the Assembly’s new legislative powers, the point was also made that there is already a fair and transparent process in place for investigating such issues. One interviewee recalled how “the Labour group was incensed” at the suggestion made by the Independent Review Panel that resources should “basically be put to the party machine, or to the group offices”. There was a strong feeling from interviewees of all political colours that AMs and their Assembly groups should have flexibility in deciding on the internal allocation of resources. This was deemed to be essential in order to reflect the different nature of AMs’ workload, with the general trend being for support staff to focus as much on administrative work as on research to underpin policy development. One reason cited for this was the improving quality of the Assembly Commission’s Members’ Research Service, which had reduced the need for research capacity within party groups.

Furthermore, a clear distinction was made between research support for policy development relating to the day-to-day activities of AMs within the National Assembly, and policy-development more generally as the basis for developing party manifestos. Several interviewees argued that the latter should be the exclusive responsibility of political parties outwith the Assembly, and that its resources should not be used for these purposes. In practice, this distinction may well be difficult to sustain, as the example of the Welsh Liberal Democrats suggests above. It leads on to a consideration of the public funding available to political parties in Wales to enhance their policy-making capacities.

The Electoral Commission’s Policy Development Grants

The Electoral Commission administers the Policy Development Grant scheme under section 12 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The scheme allows the Commission to allocate up to £2 million each year to assist in developing policies for inclusion in manifestos for elections to European, Westminster, devolved and local elections. Eligible parties are those parties that, on the 7 March each year, have at least two sitting Members of the House of Commons who have taken the oath of allegiance provided by the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866. The parties currently eligible for a grant are: the Conservative Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, the Scottish National Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party. There are clear guidelines as to the possible uses for, and limits on, this money. The Electoral Commission also audits parties’ expenditures annually.

This system of public funding is at odds with the UK’s model of devolved government in two ways:

- Eligibility is based exclusively on a political party having seats at Westminster. This fails to recognise the multi-level nature of the UK polity post-devolution, and the possibility for political parties to gain representation at the devolved level of government without necessarily being present in the House of Commons. To date, this has not happened in Wales, but it has in Scotland (with the parties such as the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Socialist Party having won seats in the Scottish Parliament). Under the current provisions, these parties were not eligible for public funding.

- In the event that political parties are eligible for a Policy Development Grants, the money is transferred to the party entity that is registered with the Electoral Commission for accounting purposes. However, there remains a stark imbalance in Welsh parties’ access to public funds for policy development purposes. Whilst Plaid Cymru is recognised...
as such an entity, the other political parties in Wales are not. Grant funds thus go to
the UK party to be distributed internally at the party’s discretion. As noted above, the
Welsh Liberal Democrats derive some benefit from these monies in the form of a funded
research officer post. However, it has proved impossible to determine to what extent the
same money trickles down the Welsh Labour and Conservative parties as part of their
block grants from their respective UK parties.

Revising the allocation of Policy Development Grant funds is necessary in order to acknowledge
the territorial nature of parties’ policy development in a devolved UK. Doing so could also make a
major contribution to the capacity of political parties in Wales to produce high-quality policies as
a basis for better governance.

That such potential is there is evident from Plaid Cymru’s enriching experience as a consequence of
receiving Policy Development Grants, as outlined above. Making such resources available to other
political parties in Wales on a fair and transparent basis could further enhance their ability to engage
meaningfully and effectively with policy-making. It would support the current areas of weakness as
identified in the section above, such as initiatives like Welsh Labour’s Ideas Wales think-tank, and
professional staff to undertake and support policy-development.

There are examples of public funding of political parties that take the territorial structure of the
state into account. In Germany, party funding is partly\textsuperscript{11} financed on the basis of the number of votes
won by a party in the most recent Land (regional), Bundestag (general) and European elections.\textsuperscript{12}
Within specified caps on the amount of funding any party can receive, there is a formula for dividing
the sums due to political parties between Land and federal party organisations (Bundestag, 2010).\textsuperscript{13}
It should be noted that this level of public funding is substantially higher than that currently available
for Policy Development Grants in the UK. Neither are the German public funds limited to policy
development.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, this model offers a way forward for thinking about the reform of the
current PDG scheme in such a way that recognises the territorial structure of the UK state, and
increases the resources available for developing policy-making capacity within the devolved nations.

Objections to such a reform of the current Policy Development Grant system are numerous.
Interviewees noted the likely public hostility to any discussion about the public funding available to
political parties, given the current climate of financial restraint and general distrust of the political
class. Several made a related point about the propriety of giving political parties money to fund
policy development.

Moreover, among the state-wide parties in Wales, whilst the Liberal Democrat interviewees
bemoaned the lack of funding for policy development, there was no strong feeling among Welsh
Labour and Conservative representatives that this was a priority issue. The words of one interviewee
was representative of this sentiment:

“I don’t think we do too badly in terms of getting our share [of public funding for political
parties], and undoubtedly we benefit in an ideas sense from being part of a wider UK
pool. If the system were to dilute our ability to be part of a wider debate, then there
would be a downside”.

Another interviewee was concerned about the possible impact on increasing public funding for
policy development on intra-party democracy:

“... increased public funding dents radicalism...Public funding of parties almost always
follows votes, rather than what its ideology is... The more power you give to the centre, who would control that decision making?"

These are valid concerns, not least in terms of the politics of getting reform of the Policy Development Grants into legislation - this would require revising the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 in Westminster. Nevertheless, the territorial anomalies in the scheme’s administration and the potential for enhancing policy-making capacity in Wales and other devolved nations merit serious consideration of such a reform.

Notes

1  The Scottish and Welsh Labour parties are allocated 8 members each on the National Policy Forum (two from the regional party, five representing local constituency parties and one from local youth sections) out of around 180 members (Laffin and Shaw, 2007: 64).

2  Such criticisms are not confined to Wales, but have also been made of the system at a UK level (see Laffin and Shaw, 2007: 64). Under the Ed Miliband’s leadership, a review of Partnership in Power was launched and is on-going (see Labour Party, 2010).

3  In 1969, a Welsh Policy Committee was resurrected within Conservative Central Office composed of Welsh parliamentarians. With the party back in government from 1979 until 1997, the policy initiative shifted to the Welsh Office, under the direction of the Secretary of State for Wales.

4  The party in Wales is responsible for raising its own finances, although in practice difficulties in doing so has meant assistance being provided by the UK party.

5  Prior to February 2006, the leader of the Plaid Cymru Group in the Assembly was not necessarily also the leader of the party as a whole. These two roles were merged in 2006, designating the leader of the party in the Assembly overall party leader. According to some interviewees, the previous division of labour contributed to confusion over the priorities for policy-making within different fora within Plaid Cymru.

6  This dimension is considered in more detail in the accompanying Research Paper examining civil society.

7  See the accompany Research Paper on the Welsh civil service.

8  Named after the Labour MP Ted Short who, when Leader of the Commons in 1975 first introduced statutory provision of funding for Opposition parties for research purposes.

9  A further difference in Scotland is that this money is available only to ‘non-executive parties’ with the exception of small coalition partners (see SPICe, 2010).

10  This is via a Remuneration Board established by the National Assembly in 2010. The Board is currently reviewing the levels of support given to AMs and is due to report in April 2013.

11  A second aspect of party funding takes into account the funds received by parties from other sources, such as membership contributions and donations.

12  Specifically, under section 18 (3) of the Law on Political Parties, parties entitled to state funding receive €0.85 per valid vote won at the most recent European, Bundestag and Land elections up to a total of four million votes, and €0.70 for every additional vote thereafter.

13  Of the total state funding allocated to the party as a whole, party organisations at the Land level receive €0.50 for each vote cast for the party at the most recent Land elections.

14  This function is largely undertaken by foundations closely linked to German political parties, but which have a separate revenue stream derived from the annual federal budget (for more information, see Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991).
References


Appendix 1 - List of Interviews

Welsh Labour Party
Andrew Davies
Mark Drakeford AM
Gary Owen
Chris Roberts
Darren Williams

Welsh Conservative Party
Nick Bourne
Lisa Francis
Leigh Jeffes
Lyndon Jones
David Melding AM

Welsh Liberal Democrats
Myrddin Edwards
Lord Mike German
Alison Goldsworthy
Baronness Jenny Randerson
Kirsty Williams AM

Plaid Cymru
Elin Jones AM
Simon Thomas AM
Dafydd Trystan

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