EUROPE: UNITED OR DIVIDED BY CULTURE?

BY ANTHONY EVERITT

european cultural foundation

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Eduard Delgado and Arthur Marwick

About the Author

Anthony Everitt is a writer. He is a former Secretary General of the Arts Council of Great Britain and international consultant on cultural policy and planning. Before moving to ACGB he was features editor for The Birmingham Post, and wrote on the arts and design, including a history of abstract expressionism. He served on various ACGB advisory panels, and after managing an arts centre in Nottingham became Director of East Midlands Arts Association.

His publications include Joining In, a study of participatory music in the United Kingdom, and New Voices, a review of community radio. He was written lives of Cicero and the emperor Augustus. He is a Companion of the Liverpool Academy of Performing Arts and an Honorary Fellow of Dartington College of Arts.

PREFACE

This short book by Professor Anthony Everitt explores the issues raised during a series of seminars on European culture held at Chatham House in London between January 2003 and January 2005. It was the first occasion that the Royal Institute of International Affairs, generally known as Chatham House, had directly addressed questions of culture in a series of this kind.

What follows is not a report of what was said, lecture by lecture and debate by debate, but a reflection on key themes that were identified and explored. It mostly derives from one or other of the seminars, but the author has raised a few additional topics that seemed to merit inclusion. The invited speakers made valuable and stimulating contributions (See Annex II), but special mention must be made of Dr Garret FitzGerald, who delivered two distinguished and substantial addresses; much of what he said has found its way with little modification into the pages that follow. The contribution of Professor Raj Isar was also helpful as the basis of some of the arguments in Chapter 4.

The seminars were a joint promotion between the UK Committee of the European Cultural Foundation and Chatham House. They were administered by International Intelligence on Culture, which also contributed support, both financial and in kind. The James Madison Trust gave generous financial support.

We appreciate the willingness of the Institute of Welsh Affairs to publish this text.

The book is dedicated to two of the seminar speakers who are sadly no longer with us: Eduard Delgado, founder and Director, Interarts Foundation, Barcelona, and a passionate advocate of the cultures of Europe's regions and the European idea; and Professor Arthur Marwick, historian and writer on social change, culture and war.

Rod Fisher
European Cultural Foundation UK
and Director, International Intelligence on Culture

FOREWORD

'I am more convinced than ever that any effort to build a new Europe will fail unless serious consideration is given to the profound importance of the cultural dimension.'
– Wolfgang Petritsch, The Heart of the Matter.[1]

This is a strong statement – still quite a rare thing when it comes to culture and Europe – and one that probably sounds strange to many British ears ('Why build a new Europe? And why on earth drag culture in too?'). Yet this statement made by one of the advisers to the European Cultural Foundation, a man who held important positions in the context of ex-Yugoslavia, characterises the work of the ECF.

The present publication reflects the efforts of the ECF's UK Committee (now Forum) to open an informed debate on these issues, a debate involving a wide audience and international speakers. Those of us at the ECF's headquarters in Amsterdam were grateful for these debates in Chatham House. Yet some time has passed since then. What has changed at European level since the debates took place? And can we discern a new climate for European cultural discourse in the UK?

Readers will have their own opinions regarding the latter question. What can be said, however, is that such public discussions and campaigns – organised by cultural networks, organisations and civic initiatives – have had an impact on policymakers in Brussels, as well as in some EU member states.

1) www.labforculture.org

Since those Chatham House debates, significant changes have occurred, changes which constitute progress. The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, has taken a firm position on the new role of culture in the European integration process – e.g. at the Berlin conferences, 'A Soul for Europe'. The EU Commission has translated those words into strategic action, using two 'instruments': the rather symbolic 'European Year of Intercultural Dialogue' (2008), which has mobilised civil society at large, and the 'Communication for a European agenda for culture in a globalising world' – the first policy/strategy document on culture and Europe since the Maastricht treaty.

This 'Communication' seeks new methods of joint action, the so-called 'open method of coordination'. Changes to the EU internally – such as the new EU culture programme, which lessens the bureaucratic burden on applicants – have been complemented by a totally new external dimension: for the first time ever, concerted efforts have been made to conceive of the cultural components to a future EU external policy. The ECF has invested in this 'cultural foreign policy' approach by commissioning research[2] and organising high-level conferences devoted to the subject – at The Hague, March 2007, with a follow-up in Ljubljana during the 2008 Slovenian Presidency.

Of course, one must remain utterly cautious and critical in a constructive way when it comes to assessing the real impact of this 'mainstreaming of culture' – probably even more so in view of policies and politics 'on the ground'. Who would be better

2) www.eurocult.org

equipped than UK critics to remain sober? This is one reason why the ECF commissioned Christopher Gordon, along with Theodoor Adams, to produce a paper to accompany the debates at the spring 2007 'CulturePowersEurope' conference in Berlin during the German Presidency. Entitled 'The European Union and Cultural Policy – Chimera, Camel or Chrysalis?',[3] the paper certainly caused 'dialectical' irritation in a period of 'affirmation' of a new set of policies.

I would like to add a few personal observations on the role of the UK cultural/political scene in these debates. The UK plays, and has to play, a crucial part: its unique positions can enlighten the European cultural debates, beyond the expected scepticism towards 'federal' approaches. There are three main reasons for this:

The UK has accumulated massive experience of culture as a driving force in economic development, urban regeneration and creative competitiveness (key word: creative industries).

The UK has a unique position with regards to diversity policies, multiculturalism and the integration of immigrants of non-European origin. For example, an organisation such as Iniva can teach the 'continent' a lot when it comes to 'positive action', successful practice and sophisticated theory.

With its colonial and post-colonial history, the UK plays a highly significant role in shaping European foreign policies. Agencies like the British Council have developed new concepts of cultural 'mutuality' in times of global tension – for example, the Iraq war – and have also been instrumental in setting up new alliances of national cultural institutes. Recently

3) www.eurocult.org

the UK was instrumental in founding the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC). It remains to be seen whether this platform will be able to develop the conceptual and operational power to shape the cultural components of EU foreign policies.

Since the Chatham House debates documented in this book, changes have taken place in Europe and in European cultural policies. It is worth pondering why cultural policies have suddenly gained so much importance in the process of building a more powerful Europe. Perhaps, ultimately, it is because we Europeans are living in a period of massive transition, from 'national' ways of organising communities and diversity, to models that combine the national and the trans-national.

The European Union can be described as a project which, since its inception, has sought to negotiate difference and diversity differently, not as an empire. It is certainly an erroneous myth of cultural historiography that Jean Monnet said that he would start with culture if he were to begin European integration again. Following the collapse of one of the two major 'total cultural' ideologies of the 20th century, fascism, the leaders of the post-war peace-building engineered Europe very pragmatically, by intertwining nations and national economies to an extent that war became almost impossible.

The first decades of European interdependence brought peace. In solidarity and in mutual interest, prosperity has been shared. Centuries of cultural 'trial and error', glories and disasters, have led to the pragmatic political system of checks and balances we call the EU: an unprecedented success story, thanks to the voluntary ceding of powers to a supra-national

common structure. And even if Europe's political institutions are perceived, rightly or wrongly, by the man and woman in the street as bureaucratic, slow, expensive and less-than-sexy, seen from outside this same Europe exerts a magnetic appeal, tantalises with its many attractions.

EU enlargement in 2004 seemed to complete the struggle to overcome Europe's most glaring division, a struggle that was prepared and often fought by intellectuals and artists. A deep cultural change has taken place in the former Eastern-bloc countries, while it must be admitted that the 'old' member states have so far failed to 'digest' this historical reunification, which remains culturally challenging to many.

The coming decades will decide whether the European Union shapes globalisation, or is a vessel tossed in its waves. If Europe is to be empowered on the global scene it must become efficient and effective, and its citizens must participate more in the developing trans-national democracy of the 'European project'. More than this, the central, 'cultural' question of what kind of Europe we want, and in what kind of world, must be faced. How can we combine mutual respect, respect for difference, with values we Europeans are unwilling to sacrifice? Europe combines individual freedom with social responsibility for the common good; the noblest expression of its essence being respect for the culture of diversity, a benign 'assimilation' of difference, a culture of mutually recognised difference, based on shared, measurable standards in the realm of human rights.

Europe has been a grand cultural machinery of projections. This entails creating valued space for the arts, for intellectuals,

and translating freedom into manifestations of shared and diverse experience. "In the cultural sector, individual vision can have a huge and unforeseen impact."[4]

Undoubtedly, homogenising forces have become stronger throughout the world, yet it is also true that diversity is currently seen by many as a threat. We must re-interpret the notion of borders in an increasingly borderless world, and learn to balance identities and meaning. Here is a role for culture and the arts. "The roots of culture's ability to draw in bystanders, sceptics and even adversaries lie in (another) fundamental social difference between the arts and other activities – they trade in meanings."[5]

A new culture of politics requires cultural policies, frameworks to safeguard and promote 'multiple citizenship' beyond the known – the still very strong nation state – for the yet unknown, the global village. It requires policies for sharing cultures and for trans-cultural cooperation; policies that will bring into question the old game of 'sameness' v. 'otherness'.

Right now, there are no European cultural policies, unless you count a tiny and underused article (151 of the Amsterdam Treaty) and some programmes with the collective budget of a large opera house, but for 450 million citizens! What we have are 'cultural policies by default'. And herein lies the problem. Having no cultural policy is a cultural policy too, but an implicit one, driven by other actors, such as the market.

Europe is struggling to build a trans-national community based on nation states; it is struggling to attain a respectful cosmopolitan outlook on diversity; yet it has no means or

4) Matarasso, Francois and Landry, Charles (1999) Balancing act: 21 strategic dilemmas in cultural policy. Council of Europe publishing, p.7.

5) Matarasso, Francois and Landry, Charles, p.89

strategy for its 'software'. We need 'software' for the 'cultural commonwealth' of Europe. We need frameworks for culture that can bring people together not only bilaterally, or in terms of cultural 'export' or 'import', or of cultural diplomacy, or of the 'old', 'white' Europeans. Citizenship requires that people share a sense of belonging and share aspirations, whether locally or across a continent. Culture can unlock frozen curiosity, help us encounter otherness, build up respect, change mindsets.

Art reminds us of our potential to be different ('Who am I?') and to relate to others ('Who are they?'). Cultural cooperation enlarges intercultural competence.

Policies are needed to create and develop these resources. The recent EU document places emphasis on important areas of debate and argument: the importance of the creative economy; the challenges of diversity and cohesion, with intercultural competence needed at all levels; and the role of Europe in the world, which obviously includes our 'cultural positions'. This will, if adopted, pave the way for discussions about better frameworks for enhanced cultural cooperation in Europe, and about the tools and mechanisms needed. Caution is to be advised, however. A certain degree of disagreement will persist, as some politicians may not welcome even this small step. Why? Because it may in fact turn out to be a big step: something like a paradigm change.

Against such a change there will inevitably be 'ideological arguments' ('The EU is not a state, and shouldn't become one'; 'We don't need culture policies at EU level – they are the exclusive responsibility of nation states'), as well as arguments

based on resources, with 'Not a penny more for the EU budget!' being a not uncommon reaction, especially from some of the 'net payers'. And there is another argument, often heard, which has to do with EU structures of decision-making and implementation: the 'Brussels bureaucracy'.

Civil Society will be decisive in critically supporting those who want to see a European cultural agenda in a globalising world. The Commission – 'discovering' cultural civil society, and realising its usefulness as a catalyst in the power game with the member states – is seeking new alliances and forms of consultation ('Culture Forum'). It is beginning to organise itself across departmental borders so that it is better able to deal with both internal and external cultural policy.

The Communication reads the writing on the wall – that 'classical' EU politics no longer suffice – and sends out the signal that culture matters for Europe. This does not mean that we as civil society representatives should abandon dissent and independence; nor does it mean that we should expect merely symbolic policies – practical results are possible too. However, we cannot count on a miracle, on a quick, conclusive implementation. The mills of the 27 operate slowly. And rightly so. Ultimately, it is about democracy.

Chatham House provided a fitting stage for these varied and often controversial debates, conducted in the spirit of the liberal British tradition at its best. Earlier I drew attention to the lessons that the rest of Europe can learn from the UK: one of these is surely that Euro-scepticism is miles (if not kilometres) away from being Euro-phobia! But I can say without scepticism that these debates initiated by the ECF's

UK 'antenna' represent a high-water mark in the intelligent debate of issues of cultural policymaking and civic intervention in Europe today. May the debate spread – and may it take account of the new developments I have outlined, and those hopefully still to come.

Gottfried Wagner
Director of the European Cultural Foundation

INTRODUCTION

The mood was celebratory when the discussions from which this monograph has flowered were begun. The European Cultural Foundation could look back on 50 years of successfully promoting cross-border cultural co-operation. Europe's national leaders, in the Laeken Declaration, had assumed the responsibility for advancing the political integration of the Union and bringing it 'closer to its citizens'. The Convention on the Future of Europe had proposed a motto for the Union, 'United in Diversity', with no sense of impossibilist pretension. It was a propitious time to consider the place of culture in the making of Europe – or so it seemed. Even when the constitutional developments stalled it seemed to be a suitable matter to consider during the period of reflection. But few would have predicted how, in the subsequent months, questions raised in the context of Europe's political integration would acquire a sharp immediacy touching the perception of our national and even global futures.

At home, there is intensified debate about the extent of cultural conformity, which is appropriate to citizenship of a nation-state. Internationally, it is increasingly argued that national boundaries are not to be regarded as definitively ruling out forceful intervention when international cultural norms are violated. Cultural interests are increasingly perceived to be as potentially important, and even explosive, as economic interests, and no less worthy of serious political attention.

Such questioning increases rather than diminishes the relevance of the European dimension of the cultural debate.

The originating motive for European integration was to save Europeans from themselves, to prevent any recurrence of its 20th Century continent-wide catastrophes. But the new Europe, with greater self-confidence, aspires to play a beneficent role in the world beyond its own borders. If the European Union is to be capable of doing that, and perhaps even of being seen as a model worthy of imitation, then it has to be more than an intergovernmental forum seeking, from time to time, to concert action to the limited extent that passing perception of shared national interests might allow. It has to be, and be seen to be, a Union with such cultural cohesion that its citizens feel at home there. True, if it is to exercise influence for good then Europe must learn to speak in the global councils with a single voice. And as Anthony Everitt wisely indicates, that voice must represent the cultural values of the radical enlightenment: freedom of the individual, toleration, democracy, justice and the rule of law, and protection of human rights.

The cultural challenge for Europe's citizens and their representatives in government, however, is not only to fashion institutions and policies which reflect and promote these bedrock values, but also to engender the sense of belonging which gives meaning to the notion of citizenship. Negatively, that requires the confidence of the peoples of Europe that their personal, local, regional and national identities are recognised, valued and protected. Positively, the sense of belonging will flourish when the European cultural experience is valued additionally because it is shared. This embracing vision is not merely a bulwark against nationalist or ethnic particularism. It is an assertion of the breadth of the human spirit, as a consequence of which we may all hope to understand and

enjoy that which is benign but culturally unfamiliar. It accords with the early, generous, European tradition expressed in Latin by the playwright Terence, who had experience of living in North Africa before he moved to Rome. 'I am a man. Nothing which is human do I consider foreign to me.'

Lord Maclennan of Rogart
Chairman, European Cultural Foundation UK
(2001-2006)

DEFINITIONS

CHAPTER ONE
What is culture?

This chapter offers two main definitions of culture and identifies the constituents of European values.

The Enlightenment Inheritance

A useful debate on European culture cannot be held unless one first agrees what might be signified by 'culture'. It is a term with numerous meanings and progress will not be made without arriving at a common understanding.

At its most extensive, according to the Council of Europe report *In From The Margins*[6], culture 'catches in its net the totality of a community's learned experience – its conventions and values – economic, legal, political, religious, moral, familial, technological, scientific and aesthetic. In the words of the Declaration of Mondiacult (World Conference on Cultural Policies, organized under the auspices of UNESCO in Mexico City in 1982): 'In its widest sense culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs…'[7] This totality is, in T.S. Eliot's succinct phrase, the 'whole life of the people'[8].

6) Published by the Council of Europe in 1997. See 2.3.1.
7) UNESCO, *World Conference on Cultural Policies* (Mexico City, 2002), Final Report, Paris.
8) Eliot, T.S. *Notes towards the definition of culture,* Faber and Faber, London 1948

The difficulty with this definition is that it is so all-embracing as to make it an unwieldy tool of enquiry. However, if we enquire what a European cultural value system might comprise, we can offer a more focussed answer, and one that is likely to attract widespread consent.

European values originate in Judaeo-Christian religious and Greco-Roman rationalist traditions of thought, although a modern formulation is not always fully consistent with them. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Age of the Enlightenment, a set of rights emerged from the work of thinkers from John Locke to Immanuel Kant. It was given political expression in such documents as the United States Declaration of Independence and its Constitution, and the French Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man.

The essential premise of the Enlightenment was that reason is humankind's central capacity, that men and women are naturally rational and good, should have equality before the law and be able to exercise freedom of speech and thought, that human beings are perfectible and that tolerance should be extended to other creeds and ways of life. According to Kant, the Enlightenment is the 'emergence of man from his self-imposed infancy. Infancy is the inability to use one's reason without the guidance of another. It is self-imposed, when it depends on a deficiency, not of reason, but of the resolve and courage to use it without external guidance. Thus the watchword of the enlightenment is: sapere aude [dare to know]! Have the courage to use one's own reason.'

In practice, these ideas provide the intellectual basis for technological progress and a continuous improvement in

standards of living, and imply a commitment to opposition to tyranny and a democratic system of government; the de-politicization of religion and the establishment of a secular state. Twentieth century international declarations and conventions embody Enlightenment principles with little or no modification. Thus, Article 1 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.' The Council of Europe's Statute refers to 'the spiritual and moral values which are … the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy'. The commitments in its Convention for the Protection of Human Rights include the 'right to liberty and security, no punishment without law, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly'.

The main point about these rights is that they are held to be 'inalienable' and 'fundamental'. In a word, they have universal application. While they are distinctively European (or western, if we include the communities of the European diaspora in Australasia and the Americas), it follows that they are not to be seen as culturally relative, but as representing absolute standards.

Globally, this has presented some problems. Although most human beings in fact share certain basic beliefs (for example, 'thou shalt not kill'), some have interpreted the specificity of Europe's catalogue of rights and commitments as intellectually neo-colonialist. Since the settlement of large non-European communities in many European countries, it has also aroused dissent between those who adhere to secularism and those

who profoundly believe in the political and social primacy of religious belief. This is a topic to which we will return later.

Arts and Popular Culture

A high-level definition of European culture based on Enlightenment values should be accompanied by another, which centres on creative expression. This includes the arts as traditionally defined (what are sometimes called the 'high arts'). These include, first, the products of individual creation, such as music composition, choreography, playwriting, poetry and fiction, painting, sculpture and other forms of fine art, and, secondly, live events where performers interpret the creative productions of others, as in opera, ballet and dramatic theatre performances and orchestral concerts.

In these artistic forms, there are widely understood traditions which can be traced back through the Renaissance and the Middle Ages to ancient Greece and Rome; in addition, the Bible has, until the 20th century at least, had a profound impact on creative practice and thinking. While these traditions have pronounced national inflections (especially those where language is involved), most artists and those who enjoy the arts tend to see them in a wider European setting. Shakespeare is as much a part of an Italian's cultural heritage as Dante is of a Spaniard's.

However, we cannot so convincingly assert that Johnny Halliday, the French rock icon, is as recognizable an artistic figure elsewhere in Europe as he is in France. By the same token, although English holidaymakers may sample Italian popular music at a tourist destination, they are generally unlikely to buy CDs of it for home consumption.

This suggests that through its mass means of distribution – television, the various electronic music outlets and cinema – popular culture has largely failed to bring together distinctive national traditions into a coherent European 'field'. If there is such a unifying factor it comes in the (threatening, according to some Europeans) form of Hollywood movies, and American and British pop music. The issue of the *défi Américain* is addressed in Chapter 5.

In his *Democracy and the Arts*[9], Rupert Brooke asserts that the purpose of art is to 'multiply the value of the life we seek to organize'. Culture in this secondary, creative sense is not unrelated to the 'whole life of the people'. In many art forms, although not all, an imaginary space is created where the typical incidents of real life can be rehearsed without any of their consequences: this makes art a powerful tool by which we test, celebrate, criticise and develop a society's broader ideas about itself.

A few further points should be made. Culture has become increasingly central to the political and economic concerns of contemporary life. Local and regional authorities throughout the Continent have recognized the importance of the arts and entertainment in the re-branding of cities, urban regeneration and the development of their historic centres.

Also, at every level of governance and in the voluntary sector, community arts, in which citizens are encouraged to participate actively in the creative process, are widely understood to contribute to social and personal well-being and to the assertion of civic engagement.

9) Brooke, Rupert, *Democracy and the Arts,* ed. Keynes, Sidney, published by Hart-Davis, London 1946. P. 8. This undervalued monograph was originally given as a lecture to the Cambridge Fabian Society in 1910.

Precisely because of their rising prominence in public life, it is sometimes forgotten that arts at their cutting edge can be troubling, even subversive. It has been justly said that the artist has a positive duty to bite the hand that feeds it.

In summary, then, this book will use the word culture in two interconnected senses: Europe's shared values, centred on individual liberties and the rule of law, and the high arts and mass popular entertainment.

CHAPTER TWO
The many Europes of history

The long process since the end of the Second World War towards European political and economic integration, many will agree, has been a considerable success. Views differ as to how much farther this process should be allowed to go, but one way or another it is desirable that a shared European identity be fostered, for without loyalty to a shared enterprise the EU may falter. Recognition that Europe is a common market and has political institutions has been insufficient to create civic commitment to the European idea. Before enquiring further into the nature of a common European culture today, it is as well to observe that Europe is a slippery term. Its geographical definition has varied over the centuries. The Roman empire created a Greco-Roman civilization that incorporated all the lands around the Mediterranean basin. The government split into two zones, and the idea of Europe as a geographical, political and social entity originated in the western empire (from Greece westwards). The great religious schism in the eleventh century AD echoed the imperial division and led to the estrangement of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. Europe became co-terminous with western Christendom. Thanks to the endeavours of missionaries, Christendom's European frontier spread eastwards, incorporating what is today Central and Eastern Europe.

Meanwhile the Orthodox Church pushed northwards and carried the Cross to Russia. From the 17th century, however, westward-looking Tsars, Peter the Great and

Catherine the Great, transformed the oriental Russian polity into a European nation-state; it was then generally allowed that Europe's boundary should extend to the Ural mountains, thus taking in Moscow and St Petersburg. The final stage of expansion was a global diaspora; European traders and imperialists expropriated two continents, Australasia and the Americas, from their native inhabitants (who were exterminated or oppressed), creating new nation-states in the European mould.

Just as its frontiers have moved, so the extent to which Europeans recognized that they shared cultural attitudes has varied. Since the birth of Christ, there have been two high points of homogeneity. These coincided with times when Europe faced no significant commercial or economic threat, although occasionally under some external political or military pressure.

At the height of the Roman empire, a political union, with every inhabitant a full citizen (barring women and slaves), was accompanied by a shared way of life. After a period of migration and anarchy between the fifth and eighth centuries, a sense of a common culture re-emerged during the Middle Ages when the peoples of most of southern and western Europe felt themselves to be an integral part of Christendom.

For a thousand years until the mid 17th century, there existed a strong sense of European solidarity. From the age when the Franks and the Aquitanians united under Charles Martel to defeat an Arab invasion at Poitiers (thus preventing the absorption of Europe into the *Dar el-Islam)* to the battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Continent came together to defend itself

against an external military threat. As late as 1686, the Polish King, Jan Sobieski, came to the aid of the Austrians when the Turks were at the gates of Vienna.

During several centuries, in what might be seen as a belated response to the Arab invasions of the Middle East and Greece, Northern Africa and Spain, Europeans joined together to fight the enemy on its own territory, during the Crusades against the Saracens and the temporary occupation of the Holy Land.

However, the sense of a common European heritage and culture faded once again with the emergence, after the Renaissance and the Reformation, of aggressively competitive nation-states, often governed by absolute monarchs who demanded from their subjects sole allegiance. During the last three hundred years self-consciously distinctive national cultures were forged and local and regional loyalties suppressed. During the 19th century, a fierce popular nationalism was adopted as a programme by ethnic communities, which felt that their aspirations to political and cultural independence were thwarted by powerful nation-states or empires. In the cases of Germany and Italy a patchwork of little states united under the umbrella of a greater nationalism.

The Great War broke monarchical authority. The League of Nations and later the United Nations attempted to mitigate the aggressive use of force by great powers. The principle of self-determination was introduced and a large number of new, usually small and weak nation-states came into being in Central and Eastern Europe. The Continent had never been so fragmented.

Once Adolf Hitler's attempt to re-unite Europe by force (a last throw of the dice by a strong nation-state) had been resisted, matters changed for the better, at least in Western Europe. The European Economic Community (later the European Community and now the European Union) gradually established itself as a supra-national political structure that promised to restore for a third time in the history of the Continent a unified Europe based on a common system of values.

CHALLENGES

CHAPTER THREE
A common European culture?

Europe's weak sense of cultural identity is set in a historical perspective, and an account is given of the European Union's ineffective cultural programmes.

A large proportion of the peoples of Europe are now intimately bound together, for through the EU they share a code of law that treats all equally in respect of many dimensions of life. This continent-wide alliance has moved beyond its original conception as a mechanism (through the trading of coal, iron and steel) to prevent another catastrophic conflict between France and Germany and has become a motor of economic development and, increasingly, a social pact. This broader entente is in part a response to the speed of globalization, for it is only through a joint venture that Europeans can be strong enough to protect their commercial, agricultural and industrial interests. It is widely acknowledged that co-operation is essential if the continent is to remain economically competitive with the United States and Japan and, more recently, the fast-rising economies of India and China.

Also, Europe's comparative wealth has created a substantial inflow of migrants from outside the EU; immigration has international implications and cannot be satisfactorily addressed by individual nation-states. The same can be said of another challenge that has emerged in recent years, that of international terrorism.

Serious attempts have been made to foster a supra-national European 'patriotism'. A flag and an anthem were devised, which attract widespread recognition; more powerfully, the adoption of the euro as a single currency is a convincing emblem of European unity, which the majority of the EU's citizens encounter more or less continuously in their daily lives.

Nevertheless, this novel political structure has a weak politico-cultural base. Most people today have multiple loyalties and multiple identities; thus a typical German might be a fan of the Bayern Munich football team (emotional), a Roman Catholic (spiritual), a Bavarian (regional), a German (national) and finally someone with cosmopolitan interests (international). Many of us will also agree, in a somewhat abstract way, that we are Europeans, but the highest level of political authority that commands real, popular allegiance remains the nation-state.

It is worth noting, in passing, that the shared predicament of an external military threat can bind states and citizens into a powerful sense of community. From 1950 to the fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of countries in the Warsaw Pact at the end of the 1980s, citizens were generally happy for their governments to ally themselves with the United States and Canada against the risk of Soviet aggression.

However, this was a military alliance, for self-protection purposes alone, and did not require a democratic political structure on the part of its peoples, although it did have a limited common cultural basis resting on a certain idea of the 'West' and a warm memory of the war-time alliance against Hitler.

Why has the European Union failed to attract true loyalty? The answer, essentially, is that it is not a democratically elected state. As has frequently and unfavourably been remarked, the organizational structures of the EU contain a 'democratic deficit'. The power to make decisions lies mainly with the Council of Ministers, comprising elected national politicians who are not fully accountable to the European Parliament, are usually primed to represent their national interests and cannot be dismissed by a Europe-wide electorate. But at least they are elected. The EU's powerful Commissioners are appointed by their governments and the European Commission's unelected President allocates their portfolios.

In an attempt at reform, the scrutiny powers of the European Parliament have been strengthened, notably with regard to approval of the appointment of the Commission and of the EU budget, but few would claim that this has brought the EU closer to its citizens. A proposal was laid before the European Convention in 2003 that the President of the European Commission should be directly elected by the people of the Union. It is telling that it made no progress. Even the most integration-minded members of the Commission doubted that the European electorate had reached the point where its knowledge of European political personalities would allow such an arrangement to work successfully. Some Member States may resist the proposal for a quite different reason – namely, that it would confer on the President too high a degree of democratic legitimacy, and so limit their authority and that of the Council of Ministers.

The mismatch between the ever more pressing need for common action and the individual citizen's reluctance to

recognize this emotionally lies at the heart of the politico-cultural challenge now facing the European Union.

In the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Ireland, this challenge is exacerbated by the fact that their legal systems, being based on common law, are not easily married with the legal codifications of the Continent. Having declined the invitation to become a member of the original club of six, the UK passed over the opportunity to shape the European Community more to its vision than the Franco-German model it became. Also, the two countries' use of the English language links them more closely to the United States and the former white colonies of the British empire than with their partners in Europe.

Even on the French side of the Channel, the sense of European identity is still much too insubstantial to carry the weight of a European governmental structure that has reached an advanced stage of economic and political integration.

Two additional factors militate against a powerful sense of European cultural identity. First, it is an awkward moment for the promotion of a new collectivity (to supplement the familiar ones of kith and kin, town, region, nation and so forth). This is because the most striking social trend since the end of the Second World War has been a growing individualization combined with a corresponding weakening of communal systems and controls.

Sexual behaviour has been transformed as part of a general liberalization of moral attitudes. The traditional nuclear family is becoming less common. More people live alone, marry or cohabit later in life, live in one-parent households, divorce or

are voluntarily childless couples. Individualization is embodied in consumer products – for example, convenience foods, mobile telephones, iPods, PCs. As was observed in *In From The Margins,* 'people's daily timetables are now an á la carte menu rather than the old familial and collective *table d'hôte*.' [10]

Whereas individuals used to determine their identity by their local or geographical community and their social position in it, nowadays they increasingly define themselves by their chosen lifestyles and demonstrate their values by choosing from a wide range of cultural goods and services, and by their membership, often temporary and changeable, of interest groups.

Some commentators go so far as to reject communal loyalties altogether. According to Peruvian-Spanish writer, Mario Vargas Llosa:

> *'The greatest achievement of a civilization is not to have a collective identity to be stressed, simultaneously, by all its individuals. It is, precisely, the contrary: to have reached a level of economic development, of culture and freedom that allow citizens to emancipate themselves from collective identities – throwing off the yoke – and to choose their own identity, in harmony or disharmony with the rest of the tribe. In that way, the individual can exercise his or her sovereignty, becoming authentically free'.* [11]

The rise of individualization inevitably complicates the task of forging a collective European consciousness of itself. Expectations should not be set too high.

10) *In from the Margins,* op cit. para 8.1.46, p14

11) Spoken at the final conference of the series, Europe: A Beautiful Idea?, organized by the Nexus Institute, Rotterdam, 2004.

Secondly, the 'Europeans' of the diaspora in Australasia and the Americas have produced cultural products in both the arts and the entertainment industries that are widely consumed in continental Europe. What is more, they express the high cultural values of the rule of law and individual liberty as vigorously as the citizens of continental Europe, if not more so. Consequently, it is hard to draw a clear distinction between European and western values.

Inadequacy of the EU's cultural programmes

Until the Treaty of Maastricht, which came into effect in 1993, there was no obligation or permission empowering or compelling the European Community to support cultural activity. However, Clause 1 of Article 128 of Maastricht agreed that:

> *"The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore."*

The article (subsequently renumbered 151 in the Treaty of Amsterdam) goes on to say the Community should 'encourage co-operation by the member states' and, when supporting or supplementing their activity, should concern itself with the following areas: improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples; conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance; non-commercial cultural exchanges; artistic and literary creation including in the audiovisual sector.

It was added, importantly, in Clause 4 that the Community 'shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this treaty'.

The Article helpfully affords legal justification for interventions by the European Commission Directorate-General (DG) of Education and Culture, which has for many years offered modest financial support for the arts, culture and heritage. However, it should be noted that the EU's cultural role has always been seen as being subordinate to that of Member States, many of which are suspicious of interference in a field they see as peculiarly theirs. Decisions concerning culture remain subject to agreement by unanimity, despite attempts to replace this with a qualified majority. Maastricht does not offer a rallying cry for those who wish to see the active promotion of a common European culture, neither does the succeeding Treaty of Amsterdam (effective from 1997), which restated the EU's cultural remit.

In practice very little of the EU's budget is allocated (by the Education and Culture Directorate) directly for cultural initiatives. If we exclude the audiovisual sector (now part of the Commission's Information budget), less than 40 million Euros are available annually for contemporary arts and heritage projects across Europe: this is rather less than the annual subsidy for a major German opera house and represents about seven cents per EU citizen per annum. While acknowledging its limited resources, the Education and Culture Directorate believes that its funding schemes are useful and points out that every year some 200 cross-border cultural projects are financed. At least three Member States participate in each project and about 1,000 people overall are directly involved in its execution.

The Commission spends substantially more indirectly on cultural projects, especially via its Structural Funds. However, cultural projects do not qualify on their intrinsic merits, but only when they make a major contribution to wider development, employment, training and other relevant goals that seek to improve the economy.

The Media Plus programme, which aims to 'strengthen the competitiveness of the European audiovisual industry' by supporting the production and circulation of European feature films, is worth some 50 million euros annually. Nearly 120 million euros are devoted to the development of ICT technologies, a small proportion of which filters back to finance such things as virtual museums. The European Investment Bank manages a scheme called *i2i,* which invests risk capital and provides loans to cultural industries, worth between 500 and 600 million euros

The Erasmus Programme is, in a broad sense, a cultural enterprise. From 1987-88 to 2003-04, it has enabled more than a million undergraduates to study at a university in a different European country from their own, where they can learn a new language and a different culture. This programme and other NGO-managed exchange schemes supported by the EU can reasonably be supposed to make a positive contribution to the creation of a European cultural identity (although it should be noted that this is not one of Erasmus' listed objectives, which are, simply, to 'support the European activities of higher education institutions and to promote the mobility and exchange of their teaching staff and students').

As regards the EU's relations with the rest of the world, very small sums are spent to ensure a European dimension to

bilateral or multilateral festivals and celebrations. There is also a limited cultural component to the EU's aid programme for developing countries in Africa, the Pacific and Asia (the so-called ACP nations). The Education and Culture Directorate has long wished to see greater and more timely communication between national culture and foreign affairs ministries, and between them and the Commission, to enable a more effective European input. As a senior Commission official has put it, the aim is to enable 'a European cultural diplomacy' to supplement, not to overshadow, the work of national agencies concerned with cultural co-operation. It is reported that a number of countries, including China, India and Latin-American states welcome cultural projects with a European rather than a singly national dimension, but the European Commission lacks appropriate instruments to develop cultural co-operation with them in anything other than a token manner. Whether this would appeal to member states is a matter for conjecture. The European Cultural Foundation and LabforCulture commissioned research to investigate this matter further.[12]

Few will claim that Europe's expenditure on culture does any harm – and indeed most will agree that it does some good. However, hitherto the EU grant programmes have betrayed little dynamic strategic purpose so far as cultural development is concerned. To contribute to the 'flowering' of national cultures, as enshrined in the Treaty, is an imprecise aim and authorizes as much or as little as the Commission chooses, or member states allow it to do. Much is said by the Commission about the desirability of fostering a common European culture, but very

12) Two studies have been published: Dodd, Diane, Lyklema, Melle, & Dittrich van Weringh, *A Cultural Component as an Integral Part of Europe's Foreign Policy?*, Boekmanstichting, Amsterdam 2006; Fisher, Rod (ed), *A Cultural Dimension to the EU's External Policies – From Policy Statements to Practice and Potential,* Boekmanstichting, Amsterdam, 2007.

little about what might need to be done to achieve such an objective, except in fairly vague terms.

In sum, then, investment from the Structural Funds in cultural projects is welcome, but it is designed to attain social or economic, rather than cultural goals. The Media Plus programme has a clearly stated strategy, although it focuses on competitiveness rather than the fostering of a European identity.

The Education and Culture Directorate-General has too few resources at its disposal to make more than minor interventions here and there in Europe. Its work does encourage multinational co-operation on arts projects, but a trend in this direction on the part of national cultural institutes throughout Europe, acting on their own initiative, has been detectable in any event in the last two decades. EU support has not been so extensive as to make a substantive difference.

At the national level, the public is hardly aware, if at all, of the Directorate-General's activities. One may reasonably ask the question: if culture is as important to the European project as the Commission and the European Parliament suggest it is in their public statements, then why is this not reflected in the EU's expenditure?

CHAPTER FOUR
Diversity or fragmentation?

How Europe's indigenous cultural values can be reconciled with the perceived challenge presented by its non-European minorities.

The reaction against Islam

Throughout its history Europe has been a 'culture of cultures'. Across the Continent flourish many proud, indigenous communities with their own cultural attitudes and practices. With the weakening of absolutist nation-states, which imposed a monocultural template on their variegated populations and the breaking-up of the Soviet bloc, these communities flourish as never before.

National governments increasingly acknowledge and encourage this thriving diversity. Regions and cities are developing a new self-confidence. Instances of these local renaissances include Catalonia, still in the process of loosening its ties to Spain; Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to which substantial devolution has been granted or is intended; Brittany, which is reviving its Celtic identity; Lombardy, where separatists wish to reverse the unification of Italy in the 19th century; and Slovakia, which broke away from the Czech Republic. Some of the fragments from the former Yugoslavia are making good progress as independent States.

Since the Second World War large numbers of non-European immigrants, often originating in former imperial colonies, settled

in Europe. For many centuries the Continent has hosted small numbers of non-Europeans, and non-European cultures, such as the world of Islam, have had a profound and beneficial influence on the development of European arts and sciences. However, the arrival from the mid-20th century of African-Caribbeans and South Asians in the United Kingdom, Mahgrebis in France and Turkish 'guest-workers' in Germany, many of whom were Muslim, came as a shock to the natives.

The main obstacle to accommodating the newcomers was indigenous racism and, in many countries, measures were taken, under the standard of multiculturalism, to protect them from discrimination and to ensure that they had reasonable access to public resources. It was felt important that they be able to express their own cultures freely, but there was little expectation that the white majorities would take much trouble to inter-relate with them and experience for themselves these unfamiliar cultures (a major exception is the impact of black music on rock and pop music).

In a climate of largely benign indifference and some limited constructive state intervention, it was possible to adopt a modestly optimistic view: despite occasional riots and confrontations, it was expected that over time the non-European communities would adapt themselves to the lifestyle of their adopted country and be accepted into the social mainstream.

The events of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point. The fear of Islamic terrorism since the destruction of the World Trade Center and the subsequent bombings in Madrid and London, combined with new immigration pressures in recent years (both from citizens of new EU Member States

and from global asylum-seekers and economic migrants), have changed public attitudes, especially to those communities originating in the Indian subcontinent and northern Africa. On the one hand, Muslims are being asked to distance themselves explicitly from Islamist terrorism, and from those few, but loud, calls for the conquest of the non-Islamic world (the so-called Dar el Harb, or 'house of war'). For their part, many Muslims fear that there is no longer room, or perhaps permission, for them to come to their own independent judgments. They feel pressured, threatened and distrusted.

The Netherlands is a case in point. The September 11 attack transformed the terms of debate about the desirability of a multicultural society. A survey conducted two weeks after the attacks showed that a large majority of the Dutch population wished to re-introduce strict immigration control and 63% favoured the expulsion from The Netherlands of Muslims who showed an understanding of the terrorist outrage against the United States.

The Islamist murders of a right-wing politician and of a film-maker have only exacerbated the situation and in the general election of 2002 the cause of multiculturalism suffered a defeat. Unease about continuing immigration and uncertainty whether all Dutch citizens shared the same broad cultural values were major issues in the campaign.

It is estimated that immigrants will form a majority of the population of Amsterdam within five years. This demographic trend needs to be accommodated by changed cultural policies. A former Dutch minister for culture has argued that culture is the product of a confrontation of ideas and perceptions and that

cultural institutions should make space for the newcomers and encourage such potentially fertile and enriching collisions. This approach to diversity emphasized that all cultures are equal and should encounter each other on an equal basis.

However, in the new political climate in the Netherlands the fostering of diversity appears to be no longer on the agenda. The Dutch language, Dutch history and Dutch culture have become the ingredients of a national revival and, it is claimed, a hoped-for return to indigenous roots.

Re-thinking nationalism and the idea of Europe

How are we to address the increasingly fissile nature of European society? Perhaps it is time to examine the question of a common culture in the light of the Continent's increasingly diverse cultural composition. Two opposed positions can be adduced. The first asserts that public policy should avoid homogenization and assimilation, and instead actively promote cultural difference; and the second argues for integration with indigenous values.

A danger is inherent in the attempt to define a unified Europeaness – namely, that it echoes or mimics the ways in which national identities were constructed. It exploits much the same 'artefact, invention and social engineering'[13], as the historian E. J. Hobsbawn saw it when he analysed the elaborations of national consciousness in 19th and early 20th century Europe.

Even if it is accepted that the EU is not a nation writ large, the logic of identity-formation on the part of a collectivity of any size means that it resembles the processes and devices of

13) Hobsbawm, E. J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality,* Cambridge 1990. p. 10

nationalism. Intelligentsias used ancient cultural characteristics in selective and transformative ways to build the idea of the nation. They took the raw material of a communal sense of identity and altered it to serve modern purposes, reviving dead languages, inventing traditions and restoring or inventing legends. As historians such as Ernest Gellner have observed: 'Nations, as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent … political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality.'[14]

Myths of nationalism – of shared national origins and cultures – were often devised by dominant social groups and manipulated by them to form an 'imagined community', a form of symbolic bonding that over time over-rode people's various local affiliations.

An analogous process can be recognized in the efforts to construct a European identity. The discussions in Chapter 1 and in the present chapter propose such ideas as a common Christian heritage, a common political and legal history going back to the Romans, the values of humanism and of the Enlightenment. They have generated the conclusive and persuasive notion that the 'European spirit' is inextricably linked to the pursuit of values such as freedom of speech, democracy and personal autonomy.

It is argued that this kind of 'pan-nationalistic theorizing' brings with it a damaging consequence in that it creates a new set of 'us' and 'them', now triangulated into nationals, EU fellow-citizens and extra-communitarian foreigners – creating a division between 'Eurocitizens' and 'Euroforeigners'

14) Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 48-49

contradicts one of the central pillars of the European project, namely the idea of a social Europe based on human rights and democracy. The problem is exacerbated when non-European immigrants acquire national citizenship in Europe. They become a new kind of compatriot, simultaneously fellow-citizens and foreigners in the sense that some of them hold very different cultural attitudes to those of indigenous or white Europeans.

So how can this disjunction be countered? In a report for the Council of Europe, published as *Differing Diversities. Cultural policy and cultural diversity,* the sociologist Tony Bennett focused on the issues arising from the 'claims to difference associated with the international movement of peoples and, within national territories, those arising from the struggles of minorities to maintain their identity in the face of the homogenising tendencies of national cultures.'[15] These forms of diversity often challenge the basic grammar of national cultures. They derive from relations between peoples, histories, cultures and territories that cannot be reconciled with a national idea that unites a particular territory and people with one particular culture.

International immigration into Europe has brought group difference to public attention. Discussion has often polarized, on the one hand, around the classic liberal position, which posits the primacy of the individual and her/his identity over collective belonging and restricts the affirmation of the latter to the private sphere, to civil society; and, on the other hand, around a communitarian approach which sees individual identity as the product of community.

While an increasing number of individuals are opting for the right and the responsibility to choose markers and roles to

15) Bennet, Tony, 2001, Differing Diversities. Transversal Study on the theme of cultural policy and cultural diversity, Council of Europe, Strasbourg

construct their identities, a way needs to be found of reconciling the claims of individual equality with those of collective difference.

Enabling all the groups that now constitute national, and indeed European, communities to assume ownership of a composite cultural identity remains a major challenge for policy-makers. This is not simply a matter of combating intolerance and exclusion, but also of giving dignity, voice and recognition in the public sphere to different cultural groups while constructing – that is, negotiating – a sense of community.

Interculturalism goes beyond equal opportunities and respect for existing cultural differences (i.e. multiculturalism), to the pluralist transformation of public space, civic culture and institutions. Boundaries between cultures are not regarded as absolute, but as being in a state of continual change and exchange. An intercultural approach aims to facilitate dialogue and mutual understanding between people of very different backgrounds.

Those debating the relationship between cultural identity and national citizenship encounter similar claims to difference arising from the histories of related oppressions in the fields of gender, sexual preference and disability (although it has to be sadly recognized that some minority Muslim communities can be as antagonistic to women's rights and gay rights as many in the conservative white mainstream). While each of the latter have their own specific properties, there is much to be gained from looking at the intersections, for there is little doubt that the oppressions of women, gays, lesbians, disabled people, and non-white ethnicities have, in varied complex ways, underwritten and supported each other. Indeed, it is only from

the perspective of these intersections that the vocabulary of citizenship can be reshaped in ways that reflect the shift – mostly still a demand rather than an accomplished reality – from polities based on the principle of homogeneity to ones based on the principle of heterogeneity.

The pursuit of full and equal political citizenship rights is, of course, a central aspect of such concerns. But there are important cultural dimensions that need to be secured as well. In *Differing Diversities* four principles were identified as being of paramount importance in developing such a revised concept of citizenship:

- The entitlement to equal opportunity to participate in the full range of activities that constitute the field of culture in the society in question.
- The entitlement of all members of society to be provided with the cultural means of functioning effectively within that society without being required to change their cultural allegiances, affiliations or identities.
- The obligation of governments and other authorities to nurture the sources of diversity through imaginative mechanisms, arrived at through consultation, for sustaining and developing the different cultures that are active within the populations for which they are responsible.
- The obligation to aim at furthering interactions between differentiated cultural groups, rather than their development as separated enclaves, as the best means of transforming the ground in which European cultural identities are nurtured as fertile as possible for the continuing production of diversity.[16]

Europe's societies have no alternative but to accommodate new kinds of cultural difference and interaction for which their

16) Bennet, Tony, op cit, p20

historical experience has not prepared them. Unprecedented migratory flows and novel patterns of interaction with newcomers and their offspring raise questions not faced by any earlier society. They call for new thinking about the place of cultural belonging and cultural difference in human, social and political life in general.

This is easier to advocate than to accomplish. Many Europeans are still weighed down with the centuries-old ideological freight of the culturally homogenizing nation-state, which recognizes only the individual as the bearer of rights and has established itself within a homogenous legal space made up of uniform political units subject to the same body of laws and institutions. It has made its citizens equate unity with homogeneity, and equality with uniformity.

As the political philosopher Bhikhu Parekh has put it, ' "We" cannot integrate "them" as long as "we" remain "we"; "we" must be loosened up to create a new common space in which "they" can be accommodated and become part of a newly constituted "we" '.[17] In other words, the challenge is how to reconstitute the national – and European – 'we' within a public space that cherishes both plural identities and the shared identity of common citizenship.

An alternative view

Equal and respectful intercultural interchange, with each learning from each and with mutual tolerance accommodating disagreement, is only a viable project when they share fundamental values. Thus, different European cultures can mingle fruitfully because neither poses a root-and-branch

17) Parekh, Bhikhu, 2005, Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills

threat to the other. Broadly speaking, a Polish community in England or an English community in France adheres to the Enlightenment world-view as discussed in Chapter 1, and the host society has little trouble loosening the concept of 'we' to give the new arrivals some room, and in turn enjoying the cultural enrichment they bring with them.

However, what is to be done in the case of an immigrant community in Europe that holds no real allegiance to this world-view and has no intention of compromising its loyalties, especially in the case of those whose loyalties are powered by religious belief. As is noted in the UNESCO report, *Our Creative Diversity*[18]:

> *"Religion appears to be a resurgent force in human affairs today. In many parts of the world the long-term trend towards secularization may well have slowed down, if not reversed itself. As traditional norms and values dissolve, religion is perceived as a bulwark for the increasingly vulnerable sense of identity of individuals and groups … [While in many cases being a constructive phenomenon] religion has often been linked to awareness of national identity. It has affected and sometimes poisoned the relations between majorities and minorities. It has also often afforded the pretext for material or territorial conquest. Even today, politicized religion often appears to contribute more to the intensification of conflict than to the construction of peace".*

Some Muslim religious leaders and thinkers condemn the corruption of western society and its godlessness. Voices have

18) Our Creative Diversity, Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, UNESCO, Paris, 1995. p 67.

been raised against the secular state and legal system, have condemned individualism and have proposed a collectivist definition of identity. Various European emancipations, such as the equality of women and freedom to express sexual orientation, have been anathematized.

A caveat must be entered at this point. It is not at all clear that such campaigners speak for the many Muslims who are loyal citizens of European states; in fact, the evidence indicates that they do not. So the challenge which is presented may, in practical terms, turn out to be of only marginal significance. It is also fair to acknowledge the presence in Europe of Christian fundamentalists who present similar arguments; indeed, an active and devoted Christianity is close to the political heart of at least one EU member state.

That said, the emergence in Europe of atrocities by terrorists who cite Islam as the justification of their acts has concentrated minds. Public opinion, followed by a growing number of politicians, has taken fright at the posited prospect of an Islamic fifth column, which opposes basic western values.

The difficulty is that, as we have seen, these values claim a universal application. Democracy and the freedom of the individual are not relevant only to Europeans, but to everyone; by definition, human rights cannot be the rule for some people and not for others. For them to have any force at all they have to be absolute. This was the conclusion of the World Commission on Culture and Development, when it advocated a 'global ethics' based on such Enlightenment concepts as '*the idea of human rights,* the *principle of democratic legitimacy, public*

accountability and the emerging *ethos* of evidence and proof … Without an assertion of absolute standards… no reasoned discourse could be conducted. Let us rejoice in diversity, while maintaining absolute standards of what is right, good and true.'[19]

If we return now to the four-point programme in *Differing Diversities,* much of it can be warmly endorsed. It has to be recognized that in many European countries equal opportunities policies have only partially succeeded; that all communities should be enabled to express and develop their cultures; that multiculturalism with its tendency to regard different communities as self-contained entities should be replaced by an intercultural approach that accords everyone a reciprocity of respect and fosters amicable exchange.

However, the requirement that members of society be not 'required to change their cultural allegiances, affiliations or identities' presents three difficulties. First, if their beliefs contradict the basic tenets of European culture, it is hard to see why they should receive encouragement or endorsement by the state. It will be objected that tolerance and freedom of speech (and thought) are key elements of Enlightenment values, but there is a distinction between putting up with fundamental dissent and fostering it through public policy. A civilized society should certainly commit itself to the former, but would be acting irrationally if it endorsed the separate development of a culture within its territory that contradicted its deepest convictions.

Secondly, as already noted in the case of The Netherlands, citizens throughout the Continent appear to be moving decisively against the toleration of immigrant communities

19) Ibid. pp 36 and 55.

which reject integration – that is, the broad acceptance of the host society's basic values. While policy-makers in Europe's parliamentary democracies are not obliged to follow public opinion tamely, and indeed have a duty of leadership and persuasion, they would be unwise not to take this swelling tide of opinion into account.

Squaring the circle

How can an assertion that 'Enlightenment' ideas lie at the heart of European values be reconciled with cultures of non-European incomers that are sceptical of individualization and the secular state, and take an opposing view on aspects of human rights?

It is both unreasonable and impractical to expect indigenous Europeans to reject their cultural birthright. However, this is not to imply that immigrants from other parts of the world must abandon their own traditions and customs. Indeed, it would be contrary to Europe's own values to expect them to do so. Principles such as a commitment to human rights and to cultural rights, democratic participation, tolerance of and respect for the beliefs of others allow for cultural difference. In other words, a policy of assimilation, which would compel new arrivals to abandon the intellectual and emotional inheritance they brought with them, would be wrong. But it would surely be appropriate to expect them to integrate with the culture of the society they have chosen to join? 'Integrate' we may understand to mean making into a whole by bringing all parts together, de-segregating, admitting to equal membership of an 'institution'.

It follows that immigrant communities should be expected to offer allegiance to Europe's fundamental values of reason,

progress, secularization and so forth and, in return, would receive the fullest respect and support for the expression and enjoyment of all aspects of their cultures that do not contradict or subvert the principles of the society they have joined.

Given time, the difficulty will almost certainly solve itself. Britain has been a nation of immigrants for many centuries, and its history suggests that settled communities from abroad acquire the attitudes and characteristics of British culture over a few generations. At the same time, they often retain a residual, but fiercely felt, pride in their origins; they give as well as receive, offering a valuable additional dimension to the culture of their new homeland. The waves of Jewish exiles from Russian pogroms in the latter part of the 19th century are an exact case in point. Over the hundred years and more since they arrived in the United Kingdom, they offer a model of best practice; Jewish peasants with hardly a word of English overcame all the obstacles they faced – among them, poverty and racial discrimination – and soon became valued citizens at every level of society.

However, it would be insufficient to allow events simply to take their course. Measures need to be taken to foster a sense of being European among all the Continent's communities through shared cultural pursuits, educational programmes and political debate.

In 2005, UNESCO adopted the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Its leading objectives are:

- To protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions;
- To create the conditions for cultures to flourish and to freely interact in a mutually beneficial manner;

- To encourage dialogue among cultures with a view to ensuring wider and balanced cultural exchanges in the world in favour of intercultural respect and a culture of peace;
- To foster interculturality in order to develop cultural interaction in the spirit of building bridges among peoples;
- To promote respect for the diversity of cultural expressions and raise awareness of its value at the local, national and international levels.

These aims should be warmly embraced. In another welcome development the European Commission has denominated 2008 as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The aim is to promote intercultural dialogue as a means of helping European citizens, and all those living in the European Union, to acquire the knowledge and aptitudes that will enable them to deal with a more open and more complex environment; and raise their awareness of the importance of developing an active European citizenship which is open to the world, welcoming of cultural diversity and based on shared values.

These are objectives everyone will endorse who favours the construction of a European identity that will attract the assent not simply of the broad majority of indigenous citizens, but also of the Continent's estranged, or at least uneasy, minorities.

CHAPTER FIVE
The small world

This chapter explores the impacts of globalization on European culture in three fields: film and broadcasting, the dominance of the English language and the crisis in the cities.

Globalization – a definition

Europeans have to make their way in a globalized world, where competition offers opportunities for prosperity, but is accompanied by perceived threats to cultures and economies. Globalization is a contested term, but the International Monetary Fund offers a typical definition. It sees globalization as the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services, free international capital flows, and the ever more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology. These processes have been enabled by the development of sophisticated electronic communications. The world manufacturing economy has been restructured from a multinational to an increasingly transnational geography, entailing the dispersal of various parts of the production process from developed to developing economies. Trade barriers have been lowered (to a certain extent), tariffs reduced and free trade promoted.

Globalization has a cultural as well as a financial and economic dimension. It is marked by greater international cultural exchange than in the past; by mass tourism and travel; and a huge increase

in international population flows. Above all new technologies allow, in principle at least, access to a wide diversity of world cultures. In practice, though, the American film, television and entertainment industry has established a world-wide dominance, much assisted by the development of satellite television and the internet. Popular cultural products are also generated in countries such as Japan (for example, Pokemon and Sudoku) and Germany (for example, the global media conglomerate Bertelsmann). In India and China massive entertainment industries compete with that of the United States.

It is widely believed that the Americanisation of the popular arts presents a powerful threat to local or national cultures and some European States, with France in the forefront, have sought to counter it by various protectionist measures.

However, many of the effects of cultural globalization can be beneficial. The mutual awareness of the world's cultures by an increasing number of its population has opened new perspectives, enabling many to participate in the international trade of cultural goods and ideas. The concept of one world, one cultural space, has attracted many generations of thinkers, but can only now be realized in practice thanks to new communications and transport technologies.

Trans-border exchange and communication translate into a benevolent globalisation that breaks down physical and cultural barriers. Unfortunately, it also threatens – at least initially – deeply felt local identities, daily symbols and traditional forms of creative expression. The challenge is to accommodate the inevitable process of global exchange and establish some rules of conduct that will reinforce rather than

subvert the distinctiveness of local cultures and foster their creative development.

Film and television

The défi Américain. It should be conceded that the US drama and entertainment industry does not appeal simply because of good marketing and value for money: its programmes often have higher production values (in terms of their scope, imagined terrain, depth of characters and scale of events) than programmes made in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in Europe. The best of American television is extremely good.

However, the fact remains that British broadcasters buy American comedy and drama mainly because they cost less than half as much as domestic product and normally gain twice the audience of a similar programme made by a British production company. This has a helpful consequence: in the light of the comparatively limited budgets available to UK broadcasters, the availability of large quantities of American product releases resources for indigenous programmes.

The EU believes that pluralism in broadcasting is an important safeguard of democracy and cultural diversity, and has sought to counter the American dominance of the mass media. Its Media funding programme supports training, production development, distribution, promotion of cinematic works and audio-visual programmes and film festivals in a modest way through soft loans. In addition, the Council of Europe runs a modest film-funding scheme, Eurimages. It aims to 'promote the European film industry… by funding the co-production and distribution of European cinematographic

works'.[20] In 2005, it provided financial assistance for 57 feature films and four documentaries.

In 1989 the European Commission issued its *Television without Frontiers Directive* (current version, 1997), which sought on the one hand to ensure the free movement of broadcasting services within the internal market, and at the same time, to preserve certain public interest objectives. These objectives include the distribution and production of European audiovisual programmes – for example, by ensuring that they are given a majority position in television channels' programme schedules.

The Directive requires that 51 per cent (i.e. a majority) of Member States' TV programmes be of European content and origin. The statistics suggest this target is achieved without great difficulty. In the year 2000 Portugal just failed to meet it by half a percentage point. In Sweden 74.5% of programmes were European and in the United Kingdom 68.8%. The average across the Continent was 62 per cent. At the same time, it has to be allowed that in some cases such percentages are only achieved by scheduling domestic programmes outside peak viewing hours.

Despite the low cost of American product, its effective distribution and marketing and its generally attractive content, the fact is that most French viewers enjoy French programmes and German audiences German programmes. The real challenge comes with feature films. As regards theatrical exhibition in Europe, three-quarters of feature films are made in the United States, but only seven and a half per cent in France and seven per cent in the UK.

20) See the Council of Europe web-site http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural%5FCo%2Doperation/Eurimages/About%5FEurimages/

This remarkable imbalance is in large part explained by the fact that the size of the American domestic market and the concentration of a few powerful American distributors justifies much greater investment than can be afforded by Europe's film industries, whose markets are frequently part restricted by national languages. The worldwide reach of the English language further enlarges the market for Hollywood films. There is some irony in the fact that in world trade debates the United States so often reiterates Hollywood's call for a 'level playing field' against those nations which subsidize their film industries, when the American film industry already has huge penetration of the European market.

The small scale of Europe's domestic markets cannot be the only reason for the relative unpopularity of their domestic product, for, despite its use of English, the British film industry has succeeded neither in winning a substantial audience share in other European countries, nor in penetrating the United States domestic market to any great extent. Other reasons must be adduced which may concern the specific nature of the European national film offers and the particular appeal of American culture, presumably to be associated with the political and economic dominance of the United States.

Of all the EU Member States, France is the most hostile to what it sees as American cultural imperialism. During his tenure as French President, Jacques Chirac, strongly supported restrictions in the entertainment industry because he did not want to see 'European culture sterilized or obliterated by American culture for economic reasons that have nothing to do with real culture.'[21] France has implemented Europe's most aggressive television quota system and, at the time of writing,

21) 'We are not an average nation: an exclusive talk with Jacques Chirac', Time (11 December 1995: Interview section, p 59).

requires that no more than 40% of feature films shown in France be of non-European origin.

In addition to quotas, French television channels are required to invest 15% of their annual turnover in 'original French works' and the film industry is supported by a system of handsome subsidies. More than 150 French feature films are produced every year, usually in association with TV companies which, even with this number of movies at their disposal, struggle to find enough French product to meet their quotas and have to fall back on repeats.

How successful have these quotas and subsidies been in protecting European cultures? First, they have helped to enable the production of many new films. Without them, fewer European movies would have been made and the national film industries would be much weaker. In 2002, 625 titles were produced in EU Member States, 163 of which were made in France, compared with 60 in the United Kingdom and 96 in Italy. France's energetic policies seem to have made a positive impact in that European attendances at its films in 2002 amounted to 11% of all attendances, compared with two per cent for Germany, seven per cent for the United Kingdom and three per cent for Italy.

Nevertheless, these figures are dwarfed by attendances of 71 per cent at US films. Of the top 20 cinema admission totals in the same year, 17 were American or (in one or two cases) US-co-produced: the list was headed by a Harry Potter movie, *Spiderman* and one of the *Lord of the Rings* sequence. The most successful European release was the Franco-German *Astérix & Obélix: Mission Cléopâtre*. European attendances for each of the

top 14 films ranged from more than 40 million to 12 million; but apart from *Astérix* and *Die Another Day* (GB/US), European attendances for each of the top 20 European productions were less than nine million, with 14 of them grossing less than four million tickets sold.

These statistics make it abundantly clear that the citizens of Europe do not share their governments' fear of cultural domination by the United States and show a marked liking for American product. This is not to say, though, that there is not also a real demand for nationally originated films in Europe and for nationally originated drama on television.

Public service broadcasting

Digital television has changed the basis of the old public broadcasting settlement and generated today's multiplicity of channels. But has this multiplicity delivered a diversity of programming to match Europe's diverse communities, their tastes and lifestyles?

Until the 1980s, the regulation of radio and television in European countries developed along broadly similar lines (while noting in some cases an element of political control: for instance by Spain's and Portugal's dictatorships and, less comprehensively, in France during de Gaulle's Presidency). Most adhere to the concept of public service broadcasting and have installed a system of regulation based on principles of social responsibility – such as nation-wide availability; accommodating all tastes and interests; catering for minorities; promoting the national community (through home-grown programming); one broadcaster to be directly funded by

viewers; emphasis on high quality rather than high ratings and so forth.

In the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, laws were passed designed to ensure diversity of programming. One of these banned the simultaneous ownership of a radio station and television station serving the same market. As a result, Rupert Murdoch of News Corporation was obliged to sell his local television interests when he decided to build the Fox Broadcasting Company into a full national network.

During the 1980s much of this legislation was repealed under the leadership of the then Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Mark S. Fowler. He was quoted as saying that 'television is nothing more than a toaster with pictures', arguing that the perception of broadcasters as community trustees should be replaced by one of a marketplace for participants. One of the consequences of deregulation in the United States is that five companies, addressing a market of 300 million consumers, effectively control some 90% of the broadcast media. As a result, viewer choice has been diminished and the only means by which real competition can be fostered – namely, the entry into the market of new entrepreneurs and creative talent – has been obstructed.

Italy is another country where the broadcast media have been deregulated. From an economic point of view, the Italian television market is thriving, according to a recent report[22], with healthy advertising revenues and substantial television production. However, the bulk of television advertising revenues is earned by two large corporations, the public service broadcaster RAI (Radio Audizioni Italiane) and

22) *Television across Europe: regulation, policy and independence,* Open Society Institute, Milan 2005.

Mediaset, each of which operates three nation-wide analogue television channels. This duopoly badly affects diversity of programming and plurality of expression. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, owns Mediaset and, when in office, had the power to appoint the head of RAI. It is hoped that digitisation will break the corporations' stranglehold. However, there are fears that, in the absence of necessary legislative changes, they will be allocated enough of the digital spectrum to perpetuate their dominance in the digital market as well.

By contrast, despite some liberalization and a relaxation of media ownership rules, broadcasting in the United Kingdom is regulated by Ofcom, a relatively new body which brought together, under a single roof, a number of industry sector regulators. The BBC Board of Governors is to be replaced by a BBC Trust designed to create a clear, structural separation between the broadcaster and its regulator. As a result the basic television offer through five terrestrial channels remains rich and diverse.

Ownership and Choice. It is arguable that audience fragmentation caused by the introduction of digitization and satellite television poses a greater threat to European television than media concentration of ownership.

In 1998, television cable channels in the United Kingdom represented about 12% of the market and today their reach has doubled. Except insofar as they provide access for some viewers to satellite stations, these channels do not deal in original content, nor do they make programmes to show for the first time. They offer pre-sold products and programmes already made by America, and often rely on 'dependable

genres', such as adult programming. The result is that nearly one-quarter of the television market is served by channels which invest little or nothing in new material.

Perhaps as a consequence, the audience share of all public service channels, including Channel 5, has shrunk. Diversity of distribution does not lead to diversity in programming. Fewer people are watching television despite the fact there is so much more television to watch. Programme making is getting more risky because of the difficulty of maintaining audiences. In particular, it is becoming more perilous to invest large amounts of money in single productions. Regardless of who actually owns the channels, the nature of today's TV platforms is making it more difficult to break through with new original programmes. When it comes to media consolidation, ITV has been a harbinger. When ITV was 16 different companies, it had an energy deriving from its original competing regional franchises, each with its own creative 'personality'. Major production bases were established – among them, those in Birmingham and Nottingham. In 2002, a merger between Granada plc and Carlton Communications plc brought all Channel 3 broadcasting licences in England and Wales under single ownership.

Gradually, though, production values have been sucked out of these centres, so that they are little more now than regional news operations. Regional news programmes are expensive and regional advertising in the United Kingdom is insufficiently developed. It is becoming increasingly difficult for broadcasters to reflect Britain's geographical diversity, and government intervention to encourage more regional production would be welcome.

From time to time, broadcasters have sought ways of allowing unmediated voices to have their say through programmes guided by the people whom they directly concern and collaborations between professional and non-professional broadcasters. From 1972 the BBC's community programmes unit produced various participatory series, including *Open Door, Open Space* and *Video Diaries*. Channel Four also offered grassroots programmes such as *People to People* and *Free for All*. An important but little-publicised contribution to choice and diversity has been the development in the last 30 years in some European countries (for example, France and the Republic of Ireland) of independent community radio. In the United Kingdom, community radio licenses have been awarded since 2005. Community television licences are to follow.

Community radio stations broadcast to small catchment areas and are mostly staffed by local volunteers who receive training in station management, programme making and broadcasting. They allow communities to converse with themselves uninterrupted by a caste of professional broadcasters. People at large are empowered to represent their own experiences, beliefs and aspirations.

Today the low costs and high quality of digital cameras and camcorders enable any interested person to acquire relevant technical skills and give the public the potential to become active makers, and not merely passive consumers. At the global level, the Internet increasingly empowers individuals around the world to exchange ideas, stories, images and sounds, again without troubling professional journalists and broadcasters.

As yet it is unclear to what extent these participatory enterprises will complement, encourage change in or, even, subvert the offer of conventional television and radio.

It is odd that American culture has come to be regarded as a threat, for in truth it is neither foreign nor strange. As has already been noted, Australasia and the Americas were re-peopled by a European diaspora and their cultures remain essentially European – or, more precisely, the Old and New Worlds form the coherent assemblage we call western culture.

That said, an important aspect of cultural activity is its link to a local place of origin and it would dampen European creativity if it were to be drowned by imported artistic and entertainment product, from however sympathetic a source. The fact that most of these imports are presented in the English language suggests a possible additional threat to local linguistic cultures (a topic addressed in the following section). Subsidies are a useful means of correcting the financial advantage that enables the Hollywood studio and the American television producer to seize a larger share of European viewers or cinema-goers than they would otherwise probably obtain if circumstances were equal. They are a vital means of ensuring the continuing growth of a European audiovisual culture.

The English language in a polyglot Europe

Is the growing dominance of the English language subverting Europe's linguistic wealth? Very possibly, although it may be countered that Europe has always had a common tongue for international exchange. First, for more than one and a half

millennia Latin fulfilled this function for educated people and embodied the universality of Mother Church.

Then from the 17th century, French became the accepted language of diplomacy. During the 20th century it was gradually displaced by English, although French is still the working language of certain international institutions. Since the United Kingdom joined what was then the European Economic Community in 1972, English has increasingly become the language of choice at many European Commission and Council of Europe meetings, supported by simultaneous translation into other EU languages (except in the case of French officials, in particular, who are under instruction always to speak in their native tongue). The trend has been accelerated by the accession of Member States from Central and Eastern Europe. In 2005 it was estimated that 47% of the EU's population spoke English, whether as a first language or not, while 30% spoke German and 23% French. Where German used to be the main second language in much of Central and Eastern Europe, a shift to English is gathering pace. It seems that people throughout Europe have come to the opinion that an ability to speak English will be of economic and personal value.

Four points are worth noting, in passing, about the worldwide popularity of English. First, it can conceal different political meanings. So, for example, in southern India, the population chose English as its second language in preference to Hindi, which was seen as the chief cultural threat. Secondly, English has developed variegated resonances in different parts of the world. Words do not always have the same meanings, which can blur the language's transparency as a universal medium of communication.

Thirdly, there is a danger that English as a language of utilitarian communication will become arid, almost 'dead', if almost all users are speaking it as a second language and do not have direct access to a substantial native speaker base. This is because native speakers tend to talk in a richer and more innovative way; they have used the language since infancy for all their needs and have the confidence to replenish or 'oxygenate' it.

Fourth, the increasing dominance of English is having an adverse affect on the interest of young people in the UK to study another language in higher education.

Because of Britain's membership of the EU, issues of meaning and of replenishment present few major difficulties so far as Europe is concerned. However, the politics of the use of English is a different matter. Some member states, particularly France, deeply resent its ubiquity. They fear it will usurp other languages and regard it as part of a wider 'Anglo-Saxon cultural invasion'.

The seriousness of the threat can best be tested by analysing the categories of language use in Europe. Four levels suggest themselves:

- The institutional Europe of official administration
- The institutional Europe of political ceremony, public oratory, public appearances
- The civil Europe of domestic (national) society
- *'l'Union du Citoyen':* inter-communication among citizens.

So far as the first level is concerned, it is impractical for all the languages of now 27 Member States to be in regular and daily

use by European Commission officials for their internal dealings. Reasonably enough, they restrict themselves to the three most popular languages in Europe – English, German and French – and only go fully multilingual for public information and publicity purposes, or for European legislation which has to be translated into the national languages of the Member States. English is frequently spoken, but does not have a complete monopoly.

The same principle does not, and should not, apply to the second level, the Europe of ceremony. Prime ministers and other ministers, heads of state and members of the European Parliament use their own national languages. This is because the EU is not a full political union, such as the United States, but an alliance of sovereign states. National citizens expect to hear their leaders address them, and to read EU directives and regulations, in their native languages.

So far as civil society across the Continent is concerned, what we see emerging is a system of *diglossia,* of two languages. English is employed for a wide range of purposes including international trade, international relations, transport, high technology and tourism, as well as the consumption of some entertainment forms (film, television and popular music). People reserve the national language for other domains – for example, education, public administration, leisure activities and the legal system.

However, it should be noted that national literatures maintain a copious and many-talented production, thus ensuring that their languages are constantly renewed. Few authors have abandoned their mother tongues or write in more than one

language. Translators continue to find employment – indeed, there been a shortage of literary translators for many years.

Finally, as regards cross-border communications, English is very widely employed. Almost 90% of Europe's young people, including those from the south of the Continent in Portugal, Spain and Italy, learn English at school. Less than a half of them study French, one-quarter Spanish and one-eighth German. When they travel around the Continent and meet their international peers, English will usually be the preferred medium of communication.

This analysis suggests that the future of national languages is secure in a number of important ways. The convenience of a single universal language is generally welcome, but its use is limited to certain defined purposes. What the dominance of English has done, though, is to subvert, or at least threaten, the internationalist claims of the major European languages, either within Europe or around the world. The Germans are losing their linguistic status in most Central and Eastern European countries, but without undue protest. France preserves its lead position in Francophone Africa, parts of the Caribbean and Quebec; and Spanish, by virtue of its usage in Central and Southern America and, increasingly, the United States, remains a powerful language zone.

However, English presents a more serious challenge to Europe that calls for careful consideration. Its close association with mass entertainment affords it an authoritative omnipresence that may in time weaken local cultural offerings in national languages. The best way of minimizing this danger (as

proposed above in relation to audiovisual production) is through state subsidies aimed at fostering linguistic creativity.

Loss of local identity in urban life

The process of economic globalization is having a problematic impact on European urban life (indeed, urban life around the world). The standardization of urban commodities, transport systems and architectural style brings with it a danger that cities are being transformed into places which look more or less the same everywhere, with similar models of office districts, shopping malls, hotels and brands of international retail outlets. It is argued that this 'deterritorialization' can weaken the link between cultural activities and the specific characteristics of the locality where they take place.

Evidence suggests that although many city-dwellers are becoming richer they are not becoming happier. There is a widespread malaise that does not only relate to places where there are substantial inequalities of wealth, but also to those that are generally prosperous.

A number of different factors are at work. First, European cities increasingly suffer from hypertrophy: that is, they expand geographically, but on the whole the population does not. This is driven, in part, by 'white flight' from the inner city to spacious suburbs. Also, urban sprawl is facilitated by an erosion of planning controls. A free market model of urban regeneration is becoming increasingly popular.

The growth of sprawl goes hand in hand with dependency on the motor car. This makes more difficult the provision of

public transport systems and leads to the building of more ring roads and more motorways. The dominance of the car in cities can lead to the blighting of public space, for roads used by cars travelling at high speeds discourage pedestrians from using the surrounding area.

New forms of public space are emerging where people do not meet, but go about their business solitarily – for example, out-of-town hypermarkets and shopping centres that resemble small towns, but only consist of retail businesses; airport terminals; car parks; and multiplex cinemas.

Facing massive imports from China and India, European cities are becoming less and less competitive as manufacturing centres; they increasingly depend on an economy of shops, cafes, bars and restaurants with many jobs in the public sector (health, education, government and the like).

With the consequent multiplication of retail outlets, competition among them grows. This leads to the development of experiential retail, of shopping as entertainment. There is a risk that a city will come to be a large theme park, narrowing the urban experience and obstructing the imaginative freedom by which inhabitants or visitors can enjoy their urban environment in all its multifarious appearances and histories.

In varying degrees, social exclusion remains a serious problem in most European cities. It is true that cultural institutions have generally improved their access policies and spend more money on outreach and education programmes, and that the development of cultural quarters has simultaneously extended

creative opportunities and stimulated local economies. However, many local authorities are making insufficient progress in relation to the creation of public systems, which link disadvantaged neighbourhoods to the rest of their cities.

Expenditure on neighbourhood-based cultural centres has been in decline. Since the 1970s community artists have worked in close contact with local communities and sought to stimulate the processes of social and political emancipation. In many cases today they have been transformed into little more than trainers who work to meet precise targets concerning the development of communication skills, enterprise skills and the reduction of crime and anti-social behaviour.

Most non-European minorities have settled in cities. Urban policies ought to promote cross-fertilisation among cultures, between 'majority' and 'minorities', 'dominant' and 'sub' cultures, localities, classes, faiths, disciplines and genres, as the source of cultural, social, political and economic innovation. Such policies would prioritise, for example, funding for projects where different cultures intersect, 'contaminate' each other and hybridise, so producing new and original forms of expression. In short, an intercultural approach of this kind will help deal with the dangers of urban standardisation and the loss of distinctiveness, which are the by-products of many entrepreneurial urban regeneration strategies, and will contribute to stimulating urban creativity.

Correcting the standardization of the European city presents a daunting challenge, but the evidence suggests that appropriate cultural policies can play a useful part.

The transformation of out-of-town shopping and leisure centres and of city centres into imaginative and stimulating public realms will be one of the challenges for creative cities in the 20th century.

Some cities at least have recognised the contribution that culture can make for their domestic and international profile. Wise investment in the cultural infrastructure can significantly change perceptions of cities and enhance their visibility and, in the process, their local economies, as Bilbao, Valencia and others can testify.

Unfortunately these local authorities are the exception. Not enough have the political energy and self-confidence to make much progress. Perhaps the main reason why Gateshead Council in northern England felt able to brave negative public opinion to build Antony Gormley's colossal statue, the Angel of the North, the Sage music centre, the Millennium Bridge and the Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art was a secure majority of seats on the Council. This enabled a small group of members and officials to pursue a vision without compromise. In Portugal's Douro Valley regional politicians evaded the inevitable swings and roundabouts of democracy by appointing an artistic director with sweeping powers, able to act with the authority of a latter-day Lorenzo de' Medici.

One way or another, though, only local solutions determined by local people will have the distinctiveness and popular support to counteract the all-pervading influence of urban globalization.

CHAPTER SIX
Towards an inter-connected Europe

The challenge of creating a common European culture has been made easier by an intellectual revolution during the last 50 years. Building on Enlightenment ideas, the EU has developed four new, innovative public values – decline of national sovereignty, adherence to international law, abandonment of imperialism and a commitment to address climate change. The encouragement of creativity in Europe's citizens can contribute to a growing awareness of a common European culture. European and national institutions can do more to encourage the development of culture.

Cultural values

It is easy to be too pessimistic about the prospects for persuading Europe's citizens of the benefits that would flow from understanding that many of us share a common cultural identity. An information pamphlet published by the European Commission gets the balance right. 'In order for people to feel like European citizens, they should first and foremost feel some basic sense of geographic attachment to Europe […] in the context of European citizenship it is also important that people feel psychologically attached to Europe. Although … one can still not speak of the

existence of a truly European identity, the majority of EU citizens feel to some extent European.'

That said, much more needs to be done to enhance a European consciousness, and cultural activity can make a positive contribution. The President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, recognized this when he said: 'The questions of what Europe can do for culture and what culture can do for Europe have acquired a new sense of urgency.'[23]

What kind of cultural strategy should be advocated? The European Community undoubtedly succeeded in overcoming centuries-old mutual rancours which had led to many wars; and it met its primary economic aim – the creation of an internal market. However, these achievements were the product of Jean Monnet's favoured method; that is, no matter how well-intentioned, they were engineered behind closed doors and imposed from the top downwards. A high price was paid for this, in that many of Europe's citizens became disengaged from the project and never felt the EU belonged to them.

Now more than ever – after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the EU's enlargement to the east, and in the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center and the 'war against terrorism' – Europe requires democratic participation and a political culture that fosters a sense of public ownership and renders Europeans capable of taking joint decisions in mutual solidarity. The Union needs to become a global player with common interests and values, with a clear stance on human rights and with a commitment to cultural diversity and social responsibility.

23) Barroso, Jose Manuel, President of the European Commission, Address on 'Europe and Culture' at the Berliner Konferenz für europäische Kulturpolitik (Berlin), 26 November 2004.

A future Europe should have a highly developed political culture, of which cultural strategies form an essential democratic part. Of course, cultural policies will be devised and implemented predominantly at local, regional and national levels. However, as a complement, an EU framework for common intercultural challenges must also be set in place.

This is for three reasons:

- First, *culture and democracy:* Europe as a democratic project requires a cross-border civil society and a public European space for debate and the exchange of information, ideas, opinion, to inform the decision-making process.
- Secondly, *culture in relation to economic and social development:* Europe's creative competitiveness has been and remains a valuable asset, and its 'creative capital' needs investment. But Europe also needs to expand its 'social project' of equal opportunity and shared public and private responsibilities. Access to culture and to cultural co-operation is an indispensable ingredient of Europe's culturally diverse success story.
- Thirdly, *culture and globalisation:* Europe cannot think globally without intercultural competence, without a cultural understanding of differences and partnership. This must begin with the (cultural) inclusion of the new neighbours and extend to the cultural components of a global foreign policy. The accepted goal of safeguarding diversity applies not only in Europe, but throughout the world.

Europe's intellectual revolution

There have been some important recent developments in European political thought that are likely to reinforce the

Continent's commitment to cultural diversity and weaken national and European exclusivity.

The past half-century has witnessed a multiple intellectual revolution in European political thought, which has occurred almost without its being noticed. It contains four elements, relating to human rights, peace, relations with developing countries and global ecology. They are the building blocks from which a European identity can be constructed.

The first, chronologically, of these intellectual revolutions was the effective abandonment of national sovereignty in the field of human rights, when the European Convention on Human Rights was signed and ratified in 1950. Through this mechanism, the states of western Europe collectively guaranteed their citizens a right to appeal to a supra-national court in Strasbourg against decisions taken by their respective public authorities and national courts on the grounds of an infringement of their human rights. This was a remarkable reversal of the long-standing supremacy of national law.

Secondly, the formation a few years later of the supranational Coal and Steel Community, and subsequently the creation of the European Community, established an administrative structure through which legal disputes are determined by the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg.

In this way, for the first time since the Roman empire, a zone of peace within western Europe was established, which ruled out the pursuit of national aims by force. At another level, Western Europe expressed its commitment to the human right to life by outlawing capital punishment.

Moreover, echoing trends in international law and pronouncements by the United Nations, European countries and their publics have changed radically their attitudes to their projection of military force in areas of conflict outside Europe. It was notable that EU Member States, apart from the United Kingdom and France, declined to deploy their ground forces in the Desert Storm campaign at the beginning of the 1990s, a reluctance echoed on many sides during the current Iraq crisis.

Such willingness to engage in armed action as survives in most of western Europe is limited to the potential for a European Task Force to undertake the role of maintaining peace and protecting human rights. Few European countries would be willing today to commit an overt breach of international law, as (to cite two very different examples) when France sank the Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior, in 1985 and nascent states committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

It is true that relics of earlier attitudes to war nevertheless survive, most notably in the form of support for the armaments industry in those countries where they are a significant source of employment. Overall, however, this new public and official rejection of war represents an unprecedented reversal of the jingoism, which was only too common up to 1914, and in some countries until the end of the Second World War.

Thirdly, those European states, which between the 15th and the 19th centuries had annexed much of the globe, abandoned their empires and conceded independence to their colonies. The process of withdrawal is incomplete. The maintenance of traditional economic ties has in some cases limited the practical

consequences of decolonization. Protection of European countries' domestic economic interests, whether agricultural or industrial, continues to impoverish the developing world and many, although not all, former imperial powers continue in some degree to act in a neo-colonial manner by tying part of their development aid to the purchase by recipients of their goods and services. In addition, the repayment of debts incurred by developing countries in relation to arms purchases or loans for sometimes dubious public projects also imposes a heavy burden on developing countries.

Nevertheless, the broad thrust of European public attitudes towards poorer countries overseas is benevolent rather than exploitative, and government policies are consequently directed increasingly towards minimizing negative aspects of relations with the developing world. The lead given by the United Kingdom on the questions of debt and aid, when it chaired the meeting of the G8 countries in 2005, is a case in point.

As with the issues of human rights and pacifism, the initiative in rejecting former attitudes to the developing world has come primarily from Europe, which also provides a disproportionate share of aid, especially untied, in comparison with other donor nations. There is a marked contrast with the United States, with whom the ratio of civil to military aid to countries other than Israel is minimal.

Finally, Europe is beginning to acknowledge the need to address global ecological problems that threaten the future of the earth. Inadequate as the preliminary steps taken in this matter may turn out to be, the principal impetus to address

climate change has come from European countries, which, admittedly with little success so far and opposed by the United States, have been endeavouring to mobilize international backing for ecological measures to halt the warming of the planet.

The appearance in Europe of these four new public values can be seen as a dramatic response to the traumas of the first half of the 20th century. The United States had a quite different experience of the same period and its system of values, deriving from the founding fathers in the 18th century and the constitution they wrote, was not similarly challenged to near annihilation. While it is true that Europe and the United States share close cultural links through their common interests during two World Wars and the subsequent Cold War and through the US's dominance of popular culture during the 20th century, it is evident that their value systems have diverged significantly in certain respects (although, of course, many commitments, deriving from the Enlightenment, are shared, among them an attachment to pluralist democracy).

Despite the fact that Europe now has a distinct value system that sets it apart from the rest of the world, there is as yet little public consciousness of the cultural and ultimately political consequences of this historic advance. The promotion of a greater awareness of this achievement would perhaps generate a sense of what makes us, and marks us out as, European.

These new values are the outcome of an intellectual ferment which derives from the multiplicity of individual cultures that characterizes Europe. It cannot be merely a coincidence that in the half century that has followed the physical and moral destruction of the Second World War, from which the

Americans were spared (at least in their homeland), it is the culturally divided and diverse Europe rather than the culturally uniform melting pot on the other side of the Atlantic that has rethought and renewed so much of its political and geo-political heritage – thereby bearing witness to an intellectual vitality that no one could or did foresee in 1945.

The creative imperative

The role that culture in its sense of artistic creativity and production can play in realizing and refining a unified European identity is insufficiently recognized, as is the exact nature of that role. National governments and civic authorities rightly welcome the contribution the arts can make to celebrating a community's sense of itself. But although they can and do delight, they also instruct, sometimes with disconcerting candour. They are a chief means by which we test, criticise, sometimes even subvert a society's high values. They are the space in which those arguments about who we are and who we might be are orchestrated.

The public sphere's understanding of culture is often predicated on the notion that it enhances social cohesion, but it also explores, even pushes against the accepted boundaries of taste and morals. It can be volatile, nasty, dirty, troubling, often sexually troubling. Also, since the arrival of modernism a hundred and more years ago, some artists have asked revolutionary questions about contemporary politics.

But, despite their sometimes controversial nature, the creative arts can exert a powerful binding force. They represent another kind of knowledge, one of the imagination, which stands in complementary contrast with that of the sciences. As the poet

Shelley famously said: 'Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.'[24] At their best, while being affected by the wider culture of which they are a part, the arts retain a distinctive independence and relevance; a fine example of this is Shostakovich's Seventh (Leningrad) Symphony, which not only opens with an evocation of Nazism, but also the threat of Stalinism, and then proceeds to a triumphant and humane conclusion.

A recollection by the composer, Paul Hindemith, who fought in the German trenches during the Great War, movingly evokes the benevolent universality of art.

> *"I was a member of a string quartet that served our commanding officer as a means of escape from the miseries of war. He was a great music lover and a connoisseur and an admirer of French art.*
>
> *It was no wonder then that his dearest wish was to hear Debussy's String Quartet. We rehearsed the work and played it to him with much feeling at a private concert.*
>
> *Just after we had finished the slow movement, the signals officer burst in and reported, in great consternation, that the news of Debussy's death had just come through. We did not continue our performance. It was as if the spirit had been removed from our playing, but now we felt for the first time, how much more music is than just style, technique and an expression of personal feeling. Here, music transcended all political barriers, national hatred and the horrors of war".*[25]

24) Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 'Concluding Remarks', Defence of Poetry, 1819.
25) As cited in Geoffrey Skelton, *Paul Hindemith: The Man Behind the Music* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1975). p. 49.

What then are the practical measures that can be taken to make the most of the creativity of Europe's citizens?

Development of creative industries

The creative industries make an increasingly large contribution to economic production. The United Kingdom's Department of Culture. Media and Sport, defines them as 'those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property.' They include advertising, architecture, art and the antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, performing arts, publishing, software and computer services and television and radio.

A report to the Mayor of London[26] demonstrates that the creative industries are growing at twice the rate of any other sector. They add £21 billion annually to London's output, more than all the production industries combined and second only to business services at £32 billion. As a whole, they represent London's third largest sector of employment, with 525,000 people working either directly in the creative industries or in creative occupations in other industries. The sector also offers London's second biggest source of job growth, contributing roughly one in every five new jobs.

In the United Kingdom as a whole, the creative industries make a far more significant contribution to output than the hospitality industry or utilities and deliver four times the output of the agriculture, fisheries and forestry. The sector is a major employer of between 4-6% of the working population.

26) GLA Economics, *Creativity: London's Core Business,* London 2002.

The three largest subsectors are design, publishing and television/radio, which together account for 75% of revenues and 50% of employment. UK government figures reveal that the UK's creative industries account for over a million jobs and brought in £112.5 billion to the UK economy[27].

Although the picture is uneven across Europe, a recent study has underlined the importance of the cultural sector in general and the creative and cultural industries in particular, contributing 2.6% of the EU's GDP in 2003 and employing at least 5.8 million people.[28]

As many first world countries struggle to compete in a traditional sector such as manufacturing, the creative industries are increasingly seen as a key component of the 'knowledge economy' and as being capable of delivering urban regeneration, often in association with agencies responsible for cultural heritage and tourism.

The creative industries represent an important means of helping to deliver the EU Lisbon agenda on employment. Both the EU and national governments should ensure that the business, legal and regulatory contexts are favourable to this highly promising field of economic growth.

Cultural tourism

While it may be true that some holidaymakers go a long way to avoid new experiences (we only have to think of English pubs on the Costa del Sol), one of the pleasures of foreign travel is the encounter with other ways of living.

27) *Creative Industries Mapping Document,* Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 2001

28) KEA European Affairs, *The Economy of Culture in Europe,* report of study conducted for the European Commission, Brussels, 2006.

This may simply entail enjoying food, landscape and basic popular entertainments, but for many people foreign holidays are also an opportunity for visiting historic cities, their museums and monuments and for attending arts festivals. Public authorities, realizing that this kind of visitor typically spends more than standard tourists, have invested in the cultural infrastructure or facilitated instructive attractions, renovating historic city centres, commissioning sculpture trails, opening houses of famous artists and writers, developing industrial heritage sites, building visitor centres at old battlefields and so forth.

Of course there is a danger that a fictional heritage can be manufactured and that kitsch versions of the past are sold to the gullible tourist. However, most evidence suggests that cultural tourism in Europe enhances the understanding of other cultures and promotes solidarity and social cohesion. Here is a field where the European Commission has already intervened with profit, through supporting regional development via the Structural Funds, while the Council of Europe initiated a series of cultural tourism routes. However, continued investment will be necessary if the momentum established so far is to be maintained and consumer choice increased.

Education fosters creativity

Throughout the world governments are reviewing their systems of education. Today's post-industrial societies recognize that their future prosperity depends on the development of intellectual property through the use of 'human capital', as distinct from the traditional exploitation of raw materials, the manufacturing of goods and their distribution and sale.

Many school curricula place an emphasis on the fostering of academic intelligence. But the potential of human beings will only be fully realized if education also unlocks their creativity. Creativity has been defined as 'imaginative activity fashioned so as to produce outcomes that are both original and of value'[29]. It is an essential quality in every walk of life, including science and technology, scholarship and wealth creation. It is, of course, intrinsic to artistic and cultural production.

Culture, defined both as values and as artistic activity, should be an important dimension of schooling. An experience of the full range of cultural production and of systems of beliefs will help to equip young Europeans with a real sense of mutual solidarity, the self-confidence to cope with a rapidly changing world and the imaginative skills to make a constructive addition to the sum of human knowledge. It will also enable them to respond constructively to Europe's diversity and combat cultural intolerance and racism.

New technology and creative participation in the arts, history and heritage

It is a cliché that the internet is changing the way we work and live. What is less well understood is that it promises to transform the way we access culture. Physical remoteness from a museum or gallery is no longer an obstacle to using its resources. Museums now use multimedia technologies to make their exhibits available in new ways. From a desk-top computer it is possible to visit museum and gallery collections throughout Europe (and indeed the world), call up images of objects and search for information about them: thus, the '24-hourmuseum' is a useful electronic information resource about UK museums and galleries (although it does not yet give

29) *All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education,* report by National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education to Department for Culture, Media and Sport and Department for Education and Employment, 1999 London. p. 29.

access to collections themselves). Through networks and hyperlinks visitors can make connections between different institutions and, in a virtual sense, become their own exhibition curators.

As the holdings of archives and libraries are digitized, non-specialists will increasingly be able to conduct their own primary research into history and current affairs. It is also technically feasible for ordinary people to input into electronic archives their personal experience of events through which they have lived.

The new technologies are blurring the once fixed boundary between professional and amateur creators. Authors can, and do, publish their own books and composers their music.

A range of devices, from third-generation mobile phones to i-pods, enable users to place selected sounds and images, music and video, at their instant and permanent disposal. Developments in television technology are making more and more creative product available at will at the touch of a button. Downloading books from the web will soon be as routine as buying them from a bookshop.

In short, we are within sight of the day when it will be possible to enjoy all of Europe's cultural products for which there is the slightest demand. The implications for the construction of a European identity in which all can share are enormous.

Role of European institutions

Cultural co-operation

For many years cultural co-operation and collaboration in Europe has been hindered by a mismatch between the

expectations of the cultural sector and of governments. The benefits for the former, especially among publicly subsidized groups, primarily concern artistic and professional development. International engagements are expected to bring new creative opportunities, the promotion of new or emerging talent, the confrontation of difficult issues, enhancement of innovation and new insights for different publics. They bring with them the thrill of being confronted by a new audience and by critics with different standards, a different 'eye'.

Governments, by contrast, have traditionally used the arts to win prestige, to cement relations with foreign countries and sometimes to help deliver trade benefit and economic goals. Often working through national cultural institutes (for example, Germany's Goethe Institute and the UK's British Council), they have tended to focus on enhancing their public image or re-branding their country in foreign eyes. Their concerns are essentially diplomatic rather than cultural.

In recent years this picture has been changing, with a growing political commitment to disinterested cultural dialogue and mutual benefit to both the host country to which the national cultural institute belongs and the culture of the country of origin rather than to the self-interested pursuit of national advantage. Across the world European cultural institutes are still competitors, but collaboration is increasing with joint facilities, operations and programmes (for example, national cultural institutes from Germany, France and the United Kingdom have begun to share premises in locations outside the European Union, such as in Kiev). This trend is likely to be enhanced by the formation of a new network, EUNIC (European National Cultural Institutes), the mission of which is to provide a framework through which

these institutes can co-operate in the development of uniquely multilateral cultural projects and initiatives.

The Goethe Institute has set an example of good practice with its Islamic strategy. This is aimed at educated elites and younger audiences, mainly through access to information, conferences, seminars, arts, media and the internet. It seeks to combat stereotypes, creating opportunities for lectures and intellectual discussions, and conducts many of its programmes in local languages rather than German. Its Europe and Islam programme in association with the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London and other European cultural centres attracted large numbers of Muslim attenders. Organizations such as the British Council have sought to mend fences with young Muslims following the damage to the United Kingdom's reputation in much of the Islamic world following the Iraq war.

Core areas where the European cultural institutes could usefully work together, should include the integration of new EU Member States (including candidate countries such as Turkey, where cultural exchange programmes during the membership negotiation process could support Turkish secular civil society, as well as highlighting the Islamic contribution to European culture); the creation of cross-national and cross-regional publics; the dismantling of national stereotypes and exchange of mutual perceptions; and the promotion of multi-lingual education and educational co-operation, both bi-laterally and multi-laterally.

It should be remembered that cultural co-operation is not exclusive to nation-states. European regions and cities have become major players in the cultural sector and have acquired habits of collaboration.

European Commission

So far as the European Commission's Education and Cultural Directorate-General is concerned, its competence has been restricted by member states, fearful that the autonomy of their national cultural policies will be endangered by the presence of an active and well-funded European programme of activity.

As we have seen, the Commission has yet to forge a role, which is distinctive and strategic, and must, of necessity, complement rather than duplicate or challenge the work of ministries of culture and national arts councils.

Some argue that the EU should help to counteract or even iron out various discrepancies at the national level. Access to funding for the arts and culture varies significantly from member state to member state. Europe-wide recognition of university degrees and diplomas would facilitate exchange of talent and the opportunity for transnational career development. Tax regulations are diverse and hinder the easy and free movement of artists, arts workers and cultural goods or services, and it would be helpful if they were harmonized.

These are rational aims and worth pursuing, although some will surely fall foul of member states' anxiety to maintain their exclusive cultural competence and others will require long and complex negotiations before they can be realized.

More importantly, perhaps, the European Commission should take steps to ensure that the important commitment in the cultural chapter of the Maastricht treaty (confirmed by the Amsterdam treaty) to 'take cultural aspects into account in its

action under other provisions of this treaty' is more than a dead letter, as it is at present. It is good news that the European Commission has indicated its intention "to strengthen its internal inter-service co-ordination and deepen its analysis of the interface between cultural diversity and other Community policies". Delivery on this crucial aspect of Article 151 is long overdue.[30]

In 2004, the Commission issued a Communication on the shape of its programme Culture 2000 from 2007-2013,[31] which outlines a persuasive future policy in the cultural field. It states: 'European citizens must… be given the chance of direct, personal experience of what European citizenship and these values mean in practice – be it through participation in dialogue with the institutions, through citizen and youth exchanges, or participation in cross-border projects. Fostering the mobility of citizens, artists, cultural and audiovisual works and events, gives European citizens the possibility of encountering the common elements in their developing European identity, an identity which complements those – national, regional, ethnic, religious – that citizens already have… The new Culture programme will contribute to the flourishing of shared European cultural values on the basis of cultural co-operation between artists, cultural operators and cultural institutions. It will focus on the promotion of multilateral European co-operation and allowing a bottom-up development of a European identity through the interaction of its citizens.' Admirable sentiments indeed, but will member states agree the level of resources needed to fulfill such ambitions?

30) European Commission, 2007, *Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world,* SEC (2007)570, Brussels.

31) *Communication from the Commission, Making Citizenship Work: Fostering European Culture and Diversity through programmes for Youth, Culture, Audiovisual and Civic Participation,* Commission of the European Communities, 2004.

There is one particular area where a substantial intervention would go a long way to realizing the aims of the Communication. Since the early 1980s, a grass-roots movement spontaneously came into being, inspired by the principle of inter-action and exchange among independent cultural initiatives. International networks, which had no connection with or support from national governments, formed themselves around particular artistic categories and interests, not only within the then borders of the European Community, but also States inside the Warsaw Pact bloc. The collapse of the socialist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe gave added momentum to this movement.

These networks have made a substantial contribution to the rapid development of European cultural co-operation. They are essentially concerned with informal exchange of information, reflection and debate about their members' professional concerns. They can be seen as 'learning machines' or platforms where the shared generation and transfer of knowledge and experience can take place. Some networks come together in larger groupings – as, for instance, the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage, which is an advocacy body for international cultural networks and national cultural organizations with their own memberships.

Unfortunately, most networks have insufficient financial resources of their own apart from membership subscriptions and are fragile entities which feel unable to engage in major cultural projects. This is because they receive few subsidies; hitherto, the European Commission has refused to finance their core operational expenses. This absence of funding makes many less effective, a fault for which potential funders then criticize them.

Despite their weakness cultural networks have been of great value to European artists and producers and have gone some way to creating a single 'unified field' or community of European artists and arts producers.

The single strategic measure which the European Commission could make that would contribute most to the development of a thriving common culture would be to fund networks adequately – first, by helping to cover their administrative expenditure and, secondly, by providing grants for major inter-European cultural projects. The new Culture Programme from 2007 is positive in as much as it recognizes the value cultural networks bring to forging a closer Europe, but the budgetary resources which member states have approved for the programme remain very small.

> *The EU should not only concern itself with its own cultural development. Europe has a negative image in other parts of the world, where it is sometimes seen as an arrogant cultural, economic and social presence. This suggests the need for a strong cultural dimension to the EU's external relations policies, and it would be helpful if the Commission were to take confidence-building countermeasures.*

The European Cultural Foundation is a leading independent organization, which campaigns for, initiates, develops and supports cultural co-operation activities across the broader Europe. Backed by enlightened business and foundation leaders, artists, civil society bodies, and four political groups of the European Parliament, it is pursuing the argument put forward in Barroso's Berlin speech, which asserted:

> *'The EU has reached a stage of its history where its cultural dimension can no longer be ignored… Europe is not only about markets, it is also about values and culture… In the hierarchy of values, the cultural ones range above the economic ones. If the economy is a necessity for our lives, culture is really about what makes our life worth living.'*[32]

The ECF argues that in the present context of a massively diverse EU, the severe underfunding of cultural co-operation by the European Union should not be allowed to continue. With this in mind, it joined forces with the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage (EFAH) to campaign for a substantial increase in EU finding for culture. Their proposal was for an annual budget of 315 million Euros – just 70 cents per EU citizen, but representing a tenfold increase on existing levels. Even though this particular budgetary battle has been lost, pressure should be maintained on the European Commission and national governments. The target of 70 cents per citizen is still worth campaigning for. Consistent both with the Communication and the Berlin address, it would go a long way towards fostering a European identity and common cultures for all the Continent's citizens.

What is also evident is the need for new procedures of decision-making, implementation and evaluation and more flexibility on the part of the Commission, with an emphasis on de-concentration, and the active participation of the cultural sector.

Proposals in the *Commission Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world* for a "structured dialogue" with cultural practitioners give hope that this lesson has been learned[33]. Taken together with other proposals in the

32) European Commission, 2007, op cit.

33) Matarasso, Francois and Landry, Charles, p.89

same document to promote new partnerships and ways of working, there is an opportunity now to overcome years of relative inaction caused by the inbuilt restrictions of Article 151. However, unless this is energetically pursued it is difficult to see how culture can be 'mainstreamed' in the European project.

CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusions

A response to the question posed by the title of the Chatham House lecture series, 'Europe: United or Divided by Culture?'.

The debates at Chatham House were distinguished by a remarkable contradiction. When the question was put: 'Is there a common European culture?', it quickly became clear that the answer lay in the affirmative. At the same time, there was widespread agreement that few Europeans are prepared to acknowledge the fact.

It is generally accepted that European cultural values derive from the Enlightenment and rest on the principles that men and women are naturally rational and good, and should enjoy equality before the law and freedom for the individual. In practice, this implies a commitment to technological progress, opposition to tyranny, the de-politicization of religion and the secular state.

So far as culture is concerned in its narrower sense of the arts and entertainment, a similar answer presents itself. Europeans are conscious of a rich cultural heritage that encompasses Homer and Chaucer, Racine and Goethe, Michelangelo and Goya. Although it is true that mass popular culture tends to be nationally defined, they enjoy the products of western entertainment industries (admittedly dominated by the United States).

If we examine the politics of the past half century, the European Union has successfully healed the wounds of two

great European wars and bound together once warring nations into a permanent alliance.

In the light of this wide and deepening commonality, it is extraordinary that Europe has such a weak sense of identity. Regrettably, the European Union's political, administrative and legal institutions have failed to attract the full-blooded and full-throated loyalty of its citizens. How can this be?

One explanation is the undoubted persistence of nationalism – not simply the traditional glamour of the old nations, but also the resurgence of subjugated and oppressed national groups – and the rise of regionalism. People often prefer to give their loyalty to a visible collectivity where they live and which they can experience directly.

Moreover, it is this persistence of appeal that has hindered the 'ever closer union' envisaged by some at least of the authors of the Treaty of Rome, which brought the European Community into existence. The EU is not a state, and is unlikely to become one in the foreseeable future, thanks in large part to its members' reluctance to abandon their familiar national identities. The consequence of which is the widely discussed 'democratic deficit'. The EU's imperviousness to the popular will, as expressed in the voting booth, has alienated many citizens from the processes of European governance.

One of Europe's leading characteristics throughout much of history has been its diversity of populations and cultures. Both within the Continent and from outside, it has accepted and greatly benefited from successive movements of people. But now it appears that the mood is changing and xenophobic attitudes are entering the mainstream of political opinion.

It is a bitter paradox that immigration is doing more to foster Europe's cultural identity, albeit in a backward-looking and rejectionist version, than has been brought about by the best efforts of the EU and the Council of Europe. And we have to admit, however reluctantly, that the presence in Europe of non-European minorities, some members of which reject key values of a liberal society, does pose a real rather than an imaginary threat.

It is evident that multiculturalism, a policy which gives different communities a respected but separate status, has failed to create a coherent, mutually respectful society. It should give way to interculturalism, where communities award each other parity of esteem and seek to interact with one another to general cultural enrichment.

A difficulty arises, though, with those non-European incomers who are sceptical of individualization and the secular state, and are uncomfortable with aspects of human rights (for example, equal rights for women and non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation). This can only be resolved by a compromise: the new arrivals must commit themselves to their indigenous host's basic cultural principles and, in return, the hosts should take energetic measures to promote intercultural exchange.

If we can arrive at a mutual understanding along these lines, we will have revalidated Europe's long commitment to diversity and re-asserted its traditional belief in tolerance. That will be no mean achievement. However, it will not of itself address the larger problem of Europe's insufficient cultural identity. Indeed, until such time as the democratic deficit is made good (and when will that be so long as the EU remains a *'Europe des patries'?)*, a complete solution will continue to elude us.

However, in the interim, national governments and the European Union can do more than they are at present to encourage Europeans to recognize their mutual interests, and build an allegiance to the European Union and, more broadly, to the idea of a unified Europe. The Chatham House discussions may not have produced a blue-print, but they do offer a set of practical proposals.

As we have established, what makes the EU unique among world political systems is its assertion of four ground-breaking principles – the effective abandonment of national sovereignty in the field of human rights; a commitment to international law, including a reluctance (widespread, if not universal) to use armed force; a commitment to help developing countries (rather than to exploit them as in the days of empire); and a recognition of the need to address the global ecological crisis. These new values, based on Enlightenment thinking, are the outcome of an intellectual ferment that owes much to Europe's cultural diversity. They should be vigorously promoted by the European Commission and national governments as the basis of Europe's common culture, both in the public arena and in schools curricula.

The arts in particular are a way of telling the truth without having to use facts: that is, they are a space where values can be tested, challenged, developed and celebrated at a safe distance from the consequences of real life. Too little acknowledgment is made of the contribution that artistic creativity and production can make to the construction of a European identity.

Education systems over-emphasize academic intelligence at the expense of creative intelligence. The balance should be corrected. The new communications technologies are making it ever easier for citizens to express themselves creatively and to

access their heritage – without expert mediation. They are blurring the difference between professional and amateur creators in such fields as graphic design, community broadcasting, music composition and literary self-publishing.

Governments should enable disadvantaged communities to develop their artistic creativity by offering them subsidized access to the relevant technologies, and the EU should encourage greater exchange and networking among those who make their careers as artists, performers and cultural producers.

Our sense of what it means to be European is not only subverted by internal deficiencies, but also by the external forces of globalization. The world-wide dominance of the English language, the standardisation of cities, the internationalization of popular culture and the multiplication of broadcasting channels, accompanied by a concentration of ownership, all call for attention by policy-makers if the distinctiveness of Europe's way of life is not to be diluted.

Finally, through the Directorate General for Education and Culture, it is essential that the European Commission establish a development strategy with the prime objective of promoting culture in Europe and a sense of a shared European identity, and allocate the increased financial resources necessary for implementation.

If the European Union is to win the hearts and minds of the population it serves, it must transform itself from a top-down institution into a popular movement. But it will only be able to do so if it exploits a force which so far it has generally neglected – the cultures of Europe that enshrine its citizens' wishes and hopes.

APPENDICES

Annex i

List of seminars

'Culture in an Enlarged Europe' seminar series 2003 – 2005

- **22nd January 2003**
  The Convention on the Future of Europe: A Community without Culture?
- **19th March 2003**
  How Common is the 'Common' European Culture?
- **15th May 2003**
  What Values Underpin Cultural Policies in Europe?
- **9th July 2003**
  Does Media Concentration Accelerate the Loss of Cultural Diversity?
- **24th September 2003**
  Politics and Identity – Does Cultural Co-operation Change Anything?
- **28th January 2004**
  Must Europe Speak English?
- **31st March 2004**
  EU Support for Culture – Rhetoric or Reality?
- **8th September 2004**
  Global or Local – Which Future for European Culture?
- **28th January 2005**
  Europe: United or Divided by Culture?

Annex ii

List of speakers

'Culture in an Enlarged Europe' seminar series 2003 – 2005
NB: Designations shown are those correct at the time of each speaker's contribution. Only significant changes since then have been indicated.

Ahmed Aboutaleb
Director, Social, Economic and Cultural Development, Amsterdam City Council; former Director, FORUM, a national centre of expertise in multicultural development in the Netherlands.

Dame Gillian Beer
Professor Emeritus of English Literature, Cambridge University; President, British Comparative Literature Association; author of books on George Eliot and Virginia Woolf.

Dr. Franco Bianchini
Reader in Cultural Planning and Policy and Director, International Cultural Planning and Policy Unit, De Montfort University; adviser and writer on cultural planning strategies and urban cultural policy.

Ion Caramitru
Former Romanian Minister of Culture and Shakespearean actor; Professor of Drama; Theatre and Film Academy, Bucharest. Honorary OBE.

Delfin Colomé
Spanish career diplomat, composer and writer; former Director Asia-Europe Foundation. He was Ambassador to the Philippines and has held diplomatic posts in Bulgaria, Norway, Iceland, Mexico and UNESCO.

Prakash Daswani
Co-founder and Director, Cultural Co-operation, and presenter of the international Music Village festivals; previously Deputy / Acting Arts Director, Commonwealth Institute.

Eduard Delgado (y Clavera) (deceased)
Founder and Director, Interarts Foundation, Barcelona; former Head of Co-operation in Cultural Policies, Council of Europe; founder, Cultural Studies and Research Centre, Barcelona; Director, postgraduate studies on cultural co-operation, University of Barcelona and Girona.

Philip Dodd
Freelance broadcaster and author; Director, Institute of Contemporary Arts (until 2004); Visiting Professor, King's College, London; former Deputy Editor, New Statesman.

Raina A. Mercedes Echerer
Austrian Member of the European Parliament, Group of the Greens / European Free Alliance (until 2004); actress, broadcaster and singer/songwriter.

Prof. Anthony Everitt
Author of works on Cicero and Emperor Augustus; Visiting Professor of Visual and Performing Arts, Nottingham Trent University; former Secretary-General, Arts Council of Great Britain.

Dr. Garret FitzGerald
Former Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and Foreign Minister of Ireland; Chancellor of the National University of Ireland.

Tim Gardam
Principal of St. Anne's College, Oxford; former Director of Television and Director of Programmes, Channel 4; previously Controller of News, Current Affairs and Documentaries, Channel 5 following 20 years at the BBC.

Stéphane Gompertz
First Counsellor and Deputy Head, French Embassy, London; previously First Counsellor, French Embassy, Cairo, and Head of the Near East Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Lord Hattersley of Sparkbrook
Writer and politician; former Deputy Leader of the Labour Party; formerly Minister of Defence and Senior Minister of State at the Foreign Office.

Nick Higham
Arts and Media Correspondent, BBC; past presenter of media programmes on BBC Radio 4 and 5; previously freelance journalist specialising in media issues.

Yudhishthir Raj Isar
Professor, American University of Paris; President, European Forum for Arts and Heritage; former Director of Cultural Policies and of the International Fund for the Promotion of Culture, UNESCO.

Hywel Ceri Jones
Chairman, Executive Board, European Policy Centre, Brussels; Chairman, European Institute for Education and Social Policy, Paris; former Acting Director General and Deputy Director General of Employment, Social Policy and Industry Relations, European Commission.

Dr. Dragan Klaic
Writer and theatre critic; Professor of Theatre Studies, University of Amsterdam; former Director of the Theatre Institut Nederland; past President, European Forum for Arts and Heritage.

Georg-Michael Luyken
Managing Director of Studio L Television, Bavaria; former Deputy Director, European Institute for the Media; co-author of *Overcoming Language Barriers in Television.*

Lord Maclennan of Rogart
Chair, European Cultural Foundation UK Committee (2002-2006); Member of Parliament for 35 years until 2001; founding member of the Social Democratic Party; twice President of the Liberal Democrats.

Dr. Miklos Marschall
An Executive Director, Transparency International, Berlin; former Executive Director, CIVICUS, Washington, a global network of NGOs and foundations for civil society; former Deputy Mayor, Budapest.

Professor Arthur Marwick (deceased)
Historian, writer on social change, culture and war. First Professor of History at the Open University; held visiting professorships in Paris, Perugia and several American universities.

Gabriele Mazza

Director, School, Out-of-school and Higher Education, Council of Europe; previously Head of the Cultural Policy and Action Division at the Council; former Director, European Youth Centre, Strasbourg.

Simon Mundy

Writer, poet and cultural policy adviser; Director, Centre for the Cultural Environment, King's College, London; founder and past president, European Forum for Arts and Heritage.

Michael Kustow

Writer, broadcaster, and theatre/film producer, noted especially for projects on ancient Greece; authorised biographer of theatre director Peter Brook.

Robert Palmer

Independent cultural advisor; Director, Palmer Rae Associates; former Director General, Brussels 2000, and head of Glasgow, European Capital of Culture 1990; now Head of Culture at Council of Europe.

Nikolaus van der Pas

Former Director General, DG for Education and Culture at the European Commission, Brussels; spokesman for Commission President Jacques Santer, 1995-98; now Director-General of Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities at the Commission.

Roy Perry

Member of European Parliament for the Conservative Party from 1994-2004; rapporteur on the Parliament's Report on the application of the Television Without Frontiers Directive. Previously, leader of Test Valley Borough Council.

Lord Puttnam of Queensgate
Chancellor, The Open University; President, UNICEF UK; film producer until 1998 and a former Chairman and CEO, Columbia Pictures.

Patricia Quinn
Business and culture consultant; former Director, Arts Council, Ireland; previously Cultural Director of the Temple Bar district regeneration project, Dublin.

Jenny Randerson
Liberal Democrat Member of the Welsh Assembly; former Minister for Culture, Sports and the Welsh Language; spokesperson for education, Europe, environment, culture, economic development, finance.

Ulrich Sacker
Director, Goethe Institut, London until 2005; former Director of Goethe Institut offices in Hong Kong and San Francisco; previously Commissioner for the Promotion of German Worldwide, Goethe Institut, Germany.

Sir Robert Scott
Chairman of Liverpool Cultural Company, the operational arm of Liverpool European Capital of Culture 2008 – the bid for which he was CEO. He also led Manchester's successful bid for the Commonwealth Games (2002); Chairman, Granada Foundation.

Lord Smith of Finsbury
Labour politician for over 20 years and former Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport; now Executive Director, Clore Leadership Programme;

Abram de Swaan

Professor of Social Science, University of Amsterdam; former Dean and, subsequently, Chairman of the Amsterdam School of Social Science Research; author of *Words of the world: the global language system*.

Sir John Tusa

Managing Director, Barbican Centre, London; former Head of BBC World Service; former BBC TV presenter; writer on broadcasting, journalism and the arts.

Yvette Vaughan Jones

Director, Visiting Arts; former Director of Cardiff 2005; a former policy officer, Wales European Centre, Brussels.

Gottfried Wagner

Director, European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam; former Director, Kulturkontakt, Austria, which co-ordinated the Task Force on Education and Youth of the Stability Pact for South East Europe.

Annex iii

The organizers

European Cultural Foundation

Active in culture as well as in education and the media, the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) is Europe's only independent and pan-European cultural foundation. Established more than 50 years ago in Switzerland, and based for much of this time in Amsterdam, the ECF runs its own programmes and awards grants to promote cultural co-operation and intercultural dialogue, and stimulate the mobility of artists and creative people in Europe. It is also an advocate for sharing cultural policies in Europe. ECF's work extends throughout Europe and its neighbouring regions, where it supports capacity building and reform of the cultural infrastructure in countries in transition.
http://www.eurocult.org

European Cultural Foundation, UK Committee

The ECF works closely with a network of country committees (or forums) across Europe. During the seminar series, the UK Committee was chaired by Lord Maclennan of Rogart and directed by Rod Fisher. It's Chairman is now Iain Sproat. It provides an arena where broader European issues can be better known and understood by UK cultural organisations and policy makers and a platform for those from the cultural sector to engage in dialogue with others to strengthen cultural co-operation, human rights and democratic values.
http://www.intelculture.org/html/ecf.shtml

European Programme at Chatham House

The European Programme at Chatham House serves as a forum for research and debate on questions of politics, economics and security in Europe. Covering EU and non-EU countries alike, the Programme seeks to stimulate informed discussion and to brief politicians, officials, business, journalists and the wider public. Activities include seminars, meetings, roundtable discussions and workshops on a wide range of topics, as well as major research projects.
http://www.riia.org

International Intelligence on Culture

International Intelligence on Culture is a small independent company specialising in policy analysis and intelligence; consultancy; research; project management, and training with an international dimension. It is committed to informing and engaging practitioners and policy-makers in the international dimension of cultural activity. It is directed by Rod Fisher.
http://www.intelculture.org

Institute of Welsh Affairs

This publication has been managed by the Institute of Welsh Affairs, a think tank devoted to the development of debate on public policy in Wales. The IWA has taken a regular interest in cultural issues and in European development and recently led a multi-partner project, Creu Cyfle / Cultural Explosion, to raise awareness in Wales of the new EU member states.
http://www.iwa.org.uk