Rhys David assesses the Greece deal, and ponders whether Wales can draw anything from it.
It is good that conifers grow so quickly in the damp climate of Finland, given whole forests must have been cut down over these last six months for newspaper reporters, columnists and leader-writers to opine on the Greek debt crisis. Now, we know, it is over or nearly over, on terms that with a little more give and take might have been reached many months ago at much less cost emotionally and financially to the Greek people. So much for all that’s been written about Grexit.
But is it over or will we be revisiting the Greek crisis again in a few months’ time when the impact of the new austerity measures the Greek people are going to have to endure begin to seem unbearable? Greece is a country where the political spectrum does not merely cover different ends of the centre ground as in Britain or Germany, for example, but embraces the extremes as well. Its post-war history includes strong support for Communist ideas and the growth in more recent years of a powerful right wing party. Greece has also experienced several decades ago a coup by Greek colonels and a failed counter-coup, the end of military rule, the restoration of democracy and the overthrow of the monarchy. Pacific it has not been, and bitter enmities have lain not far below the surface, arising in part out of divisions dating back to German occupation in World War Two.
Comparisons with Wales obviously do not apply – and yet perhaps there are some parallels, economically if not politically. Both countries derive significant income from tourism and have regions where visitors are one of the main sources of income and employment. Both suffer from outward migration of some of their most talented people – to England in the case of Wales and to the wealthier parts of the European Union, including Britain, in the case of Greece. (Puzzlingly, quite a few of these Greek exiles in Britain seem to be university economists.) Neither has had great success in building manufactured product or service sector brands. Its main internationally recognised area of expertise is shipping, though the returns this provides to the Greek economy are less than they might be. Wales and Greece, in short, are – and there are exceptions, of course – low productivity, low income zones within wider currency unions, the Euro in Greece’s case, sterling for Wales, and both run substantial budget deficits.
There, this slightly tenuous comparison ends. Greece’s deficits, the failure to collect enough tax to cover spending on public services, such as health, education, pensions and social services, have had to be met by borrowings from its richer neighbours. (Or, as many would see it, are the result of irresponsible lending by its partners in the Eurozone.) For fear of moral hazard, that is that others would follow suit if it were relieved of its debts, it now has to mortgage itself for generations to come to repay what it owes to Germany, Benelux, France, and other wealthier countries.
Wales does not have a Central Bank and does not have to negotiate seriously with its partner nations in the UK for its funding. It does not even have a banking system of its own, the solvency of which politicians and the public need to worry about. As part of a political as well as currency union its deficit is met through transfers from the rest of the country, a position that, in fairness, many other parts of Britain also find themselves in as part of an economy where a disproportionate amount of national wealth and hence tax revenue is generated in London and the south-east.
Wales clearly has the best of all worlds from this system, though whether this induces complacency about our economic record and a sense that we do not need to worry about improving it is another matter. Greece clearly has the worst of all possible worlds. It cannot devalue to remain competitive and financial discipline is being administered by partner countries most of which are substantially wealthier. If the European Union were to fulfil its dream of ever closer political and economic union then a system of transfers from richer to poorer parts could be introduced, as between the individual states in the US or between the countries of the UK. Welfare payments, and Europe-wide personal, corporate and consumer taxes could be standardised across the Eurozone, and retirement ages synchronised. The Greeks would not have to worry too much about being competitive, assuming the Germans were willing – and this is a big if – were prepared to continue to pick up the bill. This is a long way off, however, and as it is the Greeks are being forced to try to achieve competitiveness while at the same time being driven to personal and corporate bankruptcy. And it is this paradox that ultimately suggests the latest solution may yet again be temporary, lasting perhaps no longer than the next repayment crisis or political backlash.
So how can the Greeks escape this dilemma? A return to the drachma is dreaded for the message it sends out and the uncertainty that would lie ahead but it is hard to see how ultimately it can be escaped. Perhaps the answer lies in what seems to be common practice in many neighbouring non-EU member states and in large parts of Latin America – a parallel currency. Travel to Egypt, Turkey and many other places, and the Euro, dollar (and to a lesser extent pound) are widely accepted (and usually regarded as of equivalent value to each other). Even if Greece left Euro temporarily or permanently Euros would still circulate freely as this is what tourists coming to a revived tourist economy would bring and spend on meals, transport, site visits, and gifts. (Accommodation and car hire are in most cases paid in hard currency – sterling or Euro – before arrival, and will mostly end up in the bank accounts of international travel agents, airlines, hotel groups and car hire companies based outside Greece.)
The new drachma could be used to pay local salaries and for domestic transactions – paying for food and other services – and would stay in Greece. In this it would resemble the local currencies that many municipalities, including Bristol and Brixton in the UK, have adopted to ensure money spent locally is recirculated in the same area, though with the crucial difference that local pounds in Britain are usually exchangeable at par with the pound sterling. To trade internationally – in order to buy the goods and services required from outside the country the reserves of Euros that the country was able to build up from its tourist trade and from selling Greek products overseas would be used. The drachma would float against the Euro and other currencies, enabling Greece to regain competitiveness in its international trade activities. In order to be able to afford essential imports Greek businesses would need to improve their productivity so that the currency maintained an upward path in value. The high cost of purchasing overseas goods while the drachma traded at a low value to the Euro would encourage import substitution. A drachma economy would also enable Greece to win back tourists lost in recent years to other more competitive non-EU destinations such as Turkey.
A formal or informal dual currency system would perhaps allow Greece to take a break but not an irrevocable one from the Euro, with the option of re-joining once its economy, unencumbered with debt after the inevitable default that would follow an exit from the Euro, had recovered and become competitive. Indeed, a system of alternative domestic and international currencies running alongside each other could be a model for other weaker Eurozone states unable to match in the short or medium term the high standards demanded by the Germans, the Dutch, the Luxembourgers and the Finns.
As for Wales the idea is not totally irrelevant. A Cardiff, a Valleys, or a Gwynedd pound would in the same way encourage the recirculation locally of money spent locally.
4 thoughts on “A solution for Greece – and Wales?”
Rhys David performs a real service by trying to bring Greek realities into focus for us here in Wales. I would, though, take issue with his statement that, “Greece’s deficits, the failure to collect enough tax to cover spending on public services, such as health, education, pensions and social services, have had to be met by borrowings from its richer neighbours.”
Greece’s budget deficit is not really the point. The Greek fiscal deficit has reduced from 12.3% of GDP in 2013 to 3.5% in 2014 and a forecast of 2.1% in 2015. (Source: European Commission, Economic & Social Affairs: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/countries/greece_en.htm). For comparison, it peaked at 15.7% of GDP in 2009! And Greek tax receipts for the first quarter of 2015 were significantly higher than expected.
It is true that Greece’s annual deficits rose sharply under various (pre-SYRIZA) governments in the booming 2000s, when German and French capital invested in Greece and bought high-yielding Greek government bonds. It was the world banking crisis of 2008 which created a problem for these speculators. The Greek government, in a dramatically changed global economic context, had to wrestle urgently with a 15.7% annual budget deficit and an accumulated debt at 120% of GDP – that’s why it needed a bailout. The bailout was NOT to maintain Greek public services, living standards and pensions; these all started to be cut back. The bailout was to enable German and French banks to get their bond money back. Through successive bailouts, foreign capital was repaid almost in full, with the debt in fact being shipped on to the Greek government, the ECB (and its special programmes) and the IMF i.e. from private to public sector.
The hard line of Merkel and Schaeuble (backed up by their junior partners in Government in the SPD e.g. Martin Schulz and Sigmar Gabriel) is about political mastery in the Eurozone as well as orthodox capitalist economics. Yanis Varoufakis is pretty much keeping his counsel until he speaks directly to Tsipras, but on his blog today, he says: “The Euro Summit statement has nothing to do with economics, nor with any concern for the type of reform agenda capable of lifting Greece out of its mire. It is purely and simply a manifestation of the politics of humiliation in action. Even if one loathes our government one must see that the Eurogroup’s list of demands represents a major departure from decency and reason.”
In passing, Rhys David makes some interesting references to dual currency (or complementary currency) systems. In the troubled times ahead, all kinds of desperate measures may need to be tried to keep goods and humanitarian necessities moving in the busted Greek economy, but surely the biggest political question is the failure of the left in Europe, so far, to speak and act in solidarity with the Greek people.
The one lesson that we can learn from the crisis in Greece is to get out of the EU as soon as possible.Many years ago Nicholas Ridley a government minister in Mrs. Thatchers government stated that the EU was a German ‘racket’ for which he was a)rebuked,b)sacked as he had upset the consensus on European ‘integration’.Whatever the ‘technical’ issues involved in current crisis in Greece the impact upon ordinary people has been disastrous,and listening to experts it more like;ly to get worse than better in short/medium term.The old mantra ‘He who pays the Piper calls the tune’ is still true and Germany as main funder wishes to impose its type of a)fiscal.b)social, type of discipline on southern parts of Europe and as such will result of collapse of EU in near future.It appears that PC wishes to separate us from UK,but join EU as full member,but Mrs Merkel wouldn’t touch us with a bargepole as we would be another member with the ‘begging bowl’ out from first date.
Interesting article particularly with respect to loss of talent, the role of a “local pound” and tourism.
Recent articles in the FT have highlighted how (young) talent is being tempted away from London to the Midlands and North West where the cost of living is lower and quality of life is higher. Wales has a significant positive differential in this area. Our arts and tourism are also strong and should have a significant role in promoting Wales’ creativity and quality of life to that talented pool and in ensuring our own pool remains established here. Perception is all and too often we are self deprecating.
The local pound (particularly as employed in Bristol) and innovative approaches such as that described in CREW’s Deep Place Study can help ensure the Welsh (and local) economy is not cannibalised by leakage across its border. However we should look well beyond our borders for inspiration, best practice and talent to develop the ideas, principles and practices our economy, environment and communities need. We should be proud to not only develop our own ideas but to steal the best from elsewhere – particularly where it comes to implementation.
A huge amount of work has gone into asking people “What is the Wales We Want”. Prudent Healthcare and the Well-being of Future Generations Act challenge us to make some radical changes which imply an evidence based shift in priorities that may well be very painful in the short term but with huge payback. There is also ample evidence of innovation in energy (tidal power in particular), low cost housing (Cardiff University this very week), and service provision.
The SNP has shown how a clear narrative can attract support and tolerance of unpopular choices. i look forward to reading in the 2016 manifestos how the conversation over the last few years is translated into a narrative people can buy into – including the pain – and how it will be made a reality through practical steps beginning over the next 5 years.
Andy Bevan has it spot on. The Greek crisis has always been about repatriating german and french investments in greek bonds. Its a lesson for a so called independent Wales. The lesson is clear. If you are seperate from the uk whose currency will you use. The historic economy of scale suggest that you would either have to create your own currency backed with a welsh bond. Just who would buy this. German bonds and french bonds are trading in a 70% deficit now. Because these two countries who created the destructive euro in the first place thought that this put them in the lead in europe with all the expansion and potential sales to these countries. And what did they encourage the greeks to buy weapons. The greeks now have a lot of very expensive german and french hardware. So a welsh bond would be out. Join the euro, not even an independent scotland would get in. The truth is in euroland that the germans in particular and the french would be horrified of a break up of the uk, as the uk are their biggest markets. The euro was cobbled together after a row between the germans and french about further political union. The germans wanted to ensure that all countries economies reached a level parity then have a currency, but the french wanted a currency and force everyone to comply. The germans lost the argument so we have this fantasy currency that it along with the eu itself is standing in the way of a progressive and successful europe. GB needs to wake up and start working to create its own trading union most of it is already in place its called the commonwealth and it is collectively more prosperous than china.
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